The Way They Did It: Manuever Warfare
By José Martinez
In the year 1757, an army directed by Frederick the Great that confronted
the Austrian army commanded by Count Leopold von Daun. In the book Great
Military Leaders and their Campaigns the book states Von Daun was “an
expert of positional warfare” (pg 167). The battle of Leuthen proved
this was not the right approach to warfare. There are numerous reasons for
which maneuver warfare is better than positional.
First, that maneuver warfare gives the chance of maintaining the offensive.
Numerous campaigns in military history prove that this is true. One example
of this can be found in the Thermopylae Campaign in which the Spartans, lead
by Leonidas, used the Thermopylae pass as their defensive position. Their
counterpart, the Persians, had the offensive. They had trespassed a great
part of Greece until the intervention of the Greeks. This was most likely
caused by the will of the Spartans to find a place in which the fleet and
the army could defend themselves at the same place. If the Spartan fleet
fell, the Persians would be able to disembark behind the Spartans and take
them in the front and back simultaneously. The Spartans where trying to find
a place in which there defense would be indestructible. That is there problem;
no defense is indestructible. The defender (the Spartans) is waiting for
the attack to cover the point that is attacked but even so the attacker (the
Persians) has the advantage because he always has a head start. In addition,
the defender has a large difficulty to know how many troops the enemy will
be able to mass in that point being all the points in his line sensible to
an attack.
Similar to the battle of Thermopylae is the battle of Somossiera in the
year 1808. In this battle the Spanish where on the defensive. As usual, Napoleon
was on the offensive. Before launching an assault with the cavalry, General
Ruffin, along with his division, tried to capture the heights of the
Somosierra Pass. Since he was unable, to, Napoleon decided to launch an assault
to penetrate the Spanish position by using the brave Poles as the spearhead.
Napoleon broke though the Spanish positions; however, this was not the case
in the battle of Thermopylae. This battle was won by a tactic known as flanking.
This tactic was also used in other battles, such as the battle of Leuthen.
The Greeks noticed that they had committed a mistake using defensive warfare.
They redeemed themselves in the battle of Salamis in the year 480 B.C. In
this battle they tricked the Persians and by pretending to escape and hiding
a part of their fleet behind the Persians and surprising them. This is one
of the properties of maneuver warfare.
The second reason for which it is for which it is important to maintain
the offensive is that they (the attackers) can chose the battle site. Being
able to choose the battle site is important because it gives more time to
learn about the terrain, it gives you more time to create more complex and
successful maneuvers and gives you a chance to perfect your position. One
example of this battle selection can be found in the battle of Austerlitz.
In the battle of Austerlitz, Napoleon perfected his position by weakening
his right flank. The right flank was mostly covered by the IV Corps of Nicolas
Soult. His corps was covering two thirds of the total line. This proved to
be decisive since this would cause the Allies to move troops to this flank
from their center and weakening it which later Napoleon would destroy allowing
him to capture the Pratzen Heights. This would have not been possible if
Napoleon had not been on the offensive because then he might have reinforced
his right flank with some of the forces that were in the center.
Secondly, maneuver warfare permits the maneuvering army to placee
the best of itself in a place where the enemy is weak. One example is the
battle of Leuthen. Frederick, the commander and king of the Prussians, used
his superior marching speed and fire potential against the more numerous
Austrians. Maneuver warfare gave him a chance to use his army in a place
in which the number of the enemy would not be great: the flank. Hills were
used as natural barriers to hide his troops while marching towards
the Austrian flank. As in most flanks, they were unprotected, but especially
because this attack was unexpected. This attack gave Frederick the chance
of being able to fire while the Austrians prepared to face the true threat.
Another example in which maneuver warfare gives a chance to have the best
of your army while confronting the worst of the opponent can be found in
the year 1807, at the battle of Friedland. Napoleon had been maneuvering
to try to force the Russians to make a mistake. When the Russians made a
mistake of separating their army by a river and not having enough bridges
to cross in case of defeat, Napoleon did not wait to attack even thought
he was in numerical inferiority. The Russian mistake had been caused by a
maneuver or trick. This trick consisted in drawing Bennigesen, the Russian
commander, to attack a supposedly unsupported corps commanded by Lannes.
This temptation forced him to cross the River Alle when he only had four
bridges to cross if he had to retreat. This mistake gave Napoleon the chance
to attack when he apparently was in inferiority. A similar situation
occurred during the Jena campaign. On 12 October 1806, Lannes crossed
the Saale River. The Prussian Hohenlohe thought he was “fighting an
isolated flank of the army of Napoleon”
(pg.235 David Chandler). However, he did not know that all the parts
of Napoleons army supported each other mutually so the next day when Hohelohe
disposed himself to attack he encountered a much larger French army.
Another example in which it can be observed that maneuver warfare is better
than positional or defensive can be found in the battle of Trafalgar. Lord
Horatio Nelson used two attack columns to concentrate in one place. This
place could be supposed by the Spanish and Frenchmen but never with much
certainty and without weakening one part of their fleet. But this might be
considered for some a place to stop, but certainly it is not since it does
not gives us a chance to evaluate why Lord Horatio Nelson followed this attack
method, which exposed him initially to massive fire. The reason for this
was that he trusted that his ships could defeat the less trained and experienced
French and Spanish in a one to one combat. Therefore, the attack in columns
can be considered the way in which Horatio Nelson achieved superiority over
a weak enemy position by attacking where he was strong. Nelson used maneuver
warfare as away to gain an advantage when the situation was against him.
Maneuver warfare might perhaps be the only way to get out a very unfavorable
situation with a very positive outcome not just to save the day but also
to attain a decisive victory. There where three occasions in which the war
turned unfavorable for the French: in 1812 during the retreat from Russia,
in 1814 During the defense of France and in 1815 during the Hundred days
campaign in each of these unfavorable moments Napoleon at least once caused
a defeat decisive to the enemy. In the year 1812, Napoleon was able to escape
Russia because of the Battle of Berezina. This was decisive because without
this victory Napoleons army would have been trapped. In 1814, Napoleon certainly
was in a very poor situation. With superior numbers, the Coalition’s
forces had begun to enter Frances original frontiers. In this desperate situation,
once again Napoleon gave his chances to maneuver warfare as he used it in
Italy during his first years. In this campaign, frequently called the
defense of France, Napoleon achieved four consecutive victories, although
they where unable to stop the Coalition it certainly gave out the message
that Napoleon was still the commander he had been before Russian campaign
and the battle of the Nations. In these four battles Napoleon fought with
superiority and always tried or accomplished the destruction of his enemies.
Finally, in the campaign of 1815, at the battle of Ligny, Napoleon used maneuver
warfare to gain his last but probably one his most beautiful victories, although
not decisive, this victory was like a hammer to the stomach of the allies.
Some victories where possible thanks to the ability of maneuver warfare of
opening doors to the use of tactics and the creation of new ones.
One other reason for which defensive warfare is useless is because it does
not permit the use of other tactics, either innovating or not. For example,
in the battle of Thermopylae the Spartans could not employ any tactics because
they where constantly under attack. The only thing they did was stand there
ground until they could. Then look at the Persians, who were on the offensive
and they used the tactics of outflanking the Spartans. Therefore what defensive
warfare does not give to you maneuver warfare provides, the possibility of
using various tactics. One example of this can also be found in the
battle of Issus. Darius (Persian king and commander) stayed on the defensive
since he was surprised by enemy troops. Therefore he could not employ any
maneuver tactics, but Alexander employ two tactics: destruction and penetration of
a line. Darius can only be attributed the correct use of land; such as the
use of rivers, coast and the construction of fortifications. During the critical
part of the battle Darius had assumed the offensive near the coastline with
his cavalry he knew this terrain was favorable for them. To counter this
Alexander counted on Parmenion to remain on the defensive; this was not for
long. Soon after, Alexander restarted the offensive along the whole of his
line but especially with his “Companions” on the right. In this
flank, Alexander routed most of the Persian units and he then turned his
units on the left. The Greek mercenaries attempted to stop his attack on
their flank when Alexander attacked again to their front with the whole of
his phalanx.
Another example of what offensive warfare gives you a chance to do can be
found in the battle of Tel-El-Kebir on the 13 of September of 1882. In this
battle the English general, Garnet Wolseley, conducted a risky night march
and surprised the men in the fortified position in Tel-El-Kebir. If Garnet
Wolseley had not done that risky march he could not have surprised the enemy
and therefore his victory would not have been as astounding. In this
battle, you can also compare the utility of fortifications versus maneuver. Clearly,
in this battle it was demonstrated that maneuver is more useful than defensive
warfare. Another advantage of maneuver warfare over defensive warfare is
its effectiviteness.
During the Ulm campaign it can be observed that the effectiveness of maneuver
was much greater that defensive warfare. During this campaign, Napoleon forced
the Austrians to surrender through the incredible use of maneuver. His casualties
where only one percent of his army while the Austrians casualties were sixty
percent of their army. This operation certainly is model of future ones because
of its planning and coordination. However, most defensive operations are
also planed and coordinated so then what is the difference? The quick movement
of coordinated troops to achieve surprise or confusion within the enemy is
one of the differences. Another example of this can be found in the battle
of Wagram in which the Archduke Charles, of which I previously stated his
like for positional warfare and Napoleon, which clearly preferred maneuver
warfare, had an encounter. In this battle Napoleon outflanked the Austrian
defensive position and turned on their flank. By doing this, he separated
them from their reinforcements. This shows another weakness of positional
warfare the defender is in a position so therefore the defender can’t
be in two positions and this make you very vulnerable to attacks similar
to this one done by Napoleon in the battle of Wagram. The counterpart of
maneuver warfare, defensive warfare has shown to not be effective in the
key battle the battle of Zama. This battle closed a series of wars, called
the Punic Wars. During this battle, the Carthaginian commander, Hannibal,
fought the Roman Scipio. The critical point of the battle arose when Hannibal’s
veterans, like Napoleons Old Guard or Spain’s Old Tercios, did not
move to charge on the disordered Roman ranks. It is unknown why this occurred
but the result was that Hannibal could not maneuver, and therefore lost this
battle. Notice that Hannibal won all the other battles in which he was the
commander except in the one he could not maneuver.
Similar to the situation of Hannibal in Zama was the situation of Napoleon
at Waterloo. Some of the similaries are that both commanders could not maneuver
and that at the end of the battle the veterans of both where routed. The
reason for which Napoleon could not employ maneuver warfare was because of
the heavy rain of the previous days were not helpful to the movement of artillery,
the key component of Napoleon’s armies. Therefore as in other Napoleonic
battles with large casualties, such as the battle of Moscova (Borodino),
Napoleon disposed his army to launch a frontal assault. Unlike the battle
of Wagram, with the use of maneuver, the battles of Zama and Waterloo are
examples of one of the ways in which defensive warfare is not effective.
The battle of Wagram also shows another of the advantages of maneuver warfare,
dependence on your own tactics.
As show in the battle of Wagram, defensive tactics are completely dependant
on the offensive tactics employed there; for defensive warfare is very sensible
to maneuver. The best example for this once again might be the battle of
Thermopylae in which the Persians outflanked the Greeks. This defensive position
was so sensitive to this weakness, that Leonidas order the retreat of the
other Greek contingents until only the 300 Spartans where left. Most kind of
warfare are sensible; for example, in numerous battles of the Napoleonic
Era one of the armies had to change their disposition because there was an
outflanking move, such as Napoleon in the battle of Waterloo. However, with
defensive warfare the situation is completely different, the whole
disposition has to be change if there is a defeat. This happened to Napoleon
during the first weeks of his campaign to defend France. After the disaster
of the battle of the Nations, Napoleon had to defend the frontiers of France.
At the beginning of the invasion, Victor was in Strasbourg and retreated
to Nancy but then he decided to abandon Nancy, which forced the other troops
in the defensive line to retreat. This detail has great importance. The whole
French line was obligated to retreat because of one man, that is the real
sensitiveness of defensive warfare. Furthermore, when Napoleon was able to
detain the army of Bohemia and notice the weak position of Blücher
he was able, though the use of maneuver, to gain a victory over the coalitions
forces three consecutive times. This campaign also demonstrated that the
only element that can make a defensive position successful is maneuver.
In three very clear occasions, defenses where conducted successfully though
the use of maneuver warfare: Austerlitz, the siege of Hamburg, and Dresden.
In the battle of Austerlitz the villages of Telnitz and Solnitz where scarcely
defended. Only the careful planning by Napoleon and his great maneuver
were able to make this defense a success. Napoleons’ system of corps
divided the army in a way that permits the interaction of the corps for support
and their rapid concentration for battle. The Corps of Marshal Davout arrived
just on time to support the flank of the French army. This maneuver made
the defense of this flank successful and therefore fully contributed to the
victory in the battle of Austerlitz. The second example, is the battle of
Dresden, also explains how a defensive position needs the support of maneuver
to be successful. During the battle of Dresden Napoleons goal was to not
let Dresden fall into the hands of the Army of Bohemia therefore, he had
to defend the city using maneuver warfare. This battle lasted two days. During
the first day, the French army was forced to retreat but regained its positions
when three e\special columns counterattacked and recuperated terrain. By
the night of the first day, reinforcements had arrived and the battle was
going to get on its decisive course. On the next day, the offensive was assumed
all along the
“defensive” line. However, with much more importance on the left
because the night rain had made the Weissertitz River a large obstacle
and only one bridge joined it to the rest of the army. Therefore, the offensive
was assumed there with more vigor than in other sector. This resulted
in the capture of the bridge to cross the river and the destruction of the
left wing of the Army of Bohemia. Notice that the defense was successful
and effective as the amount of casualties shows: 10.000 French and 38.000
of the Army of Bohemia.
The third and final example of how defense needs maneuver warfare can be
found in the siege of Hamburg in 1813 and 1814. During the siege, Davout
was besieged by Bennigesen. Bennigesen tried to capture Hamburg three times
but failed in each. He then laid siege to Hamburg. The reason for which Davout
succeeded was that he had a reserve and a system of alarm.s By this system,
Davout could concentrate the necessary force in the place that was being
attacked. This was a system of maneuver since all of the troops where within
the walls. Davout lasted through the end of the war. This defense was successful
because of the defender’s ability to maneuver.
Maneuver warfare was the only way in which separated groups of an army could
operate together to achieve a goal. Most of Napoleon’s battles are
examples of this. The system of corps consisted in that concept. Therefore,
Napoleon’s army was a maneuver army in which all the pieces where of
equal strength. In contrast in the 1807 campaign Napoleon confronted a army
that did not have in all its parts an equal amount of men in each corps.
Before the Napoleonic era armies where “a unitary mass lumbering around
the battlefield searching for a decisive battle.”(David Chandler) After
Napoleon’s armies were more organized and could seek battle where they
wanted.
Napoleon said that “Strategy is the art of using space and time.”(Técnicas Bélicas pg.
150 ) The only way to effectively use space and time would be maneuver warfare.
The reasons above resume the ways in which defensive warfare is inferior
to maneuver warfare. However, perhaps there is another way to look at this:
is defensive warfare another end to maneuver or are they different? What
are there similarities? This certainly is another story.
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