Grande Armée Veterans in the Egyptian Army of the Greek War of Independence 1824-1828
By Dale Pappas
Napoleon’s Egyptian expedition marked the origins of considerable French military involvement in Egypt during the nineteenth century. In particular, French officers emerged to shape the military of Egypt’s ruler from 1805, Mehmet Ali Pasha. Mehmet, though nominally a vassal to the Ottoman Sultan, was determined to forge an empire of his own that nearly eclipsed the House of Osmanli in the 1830s. The first step towards realizing this objective was the creation of a military modeled along European lines. European officers in search of employment following the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars served as the instructors for the new Egyptian army. Several others were sent by the French government for the same purpose in 1824, in an attempt to cultivate a potential ally in the eastern Mediterranean and restore France’s prestige as a great power in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars.
These officers, whether adventurers in search of a new military career following the Napoleonic Wars or members of the French military mission included several distinguished veterans of the Grande Armée. Among them was the commander of the French military mission, Pierre Boyer, who earlier in his career had been an aide to Napoleon in Egypt. The Egyptian army trained by these Grande Armée veterans was put to the test in the Greek War of Independence. Indeed, Greece was where the post-Napoleonic careers of hundreds of soldiers and political figures from throughout Europe collided. Veterans of the Grande Armée and other European armies flocked to both the Greek rebels and Mehmet’s Egyptian army, which was ordered to crush the rebellion in Greece by Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II. Despite most of Europe’s support of the Greek cause, roughly twenty European officers, including several veterans of the Grande Armée served the Egyptians in the Greek War of Independence. Consequently, the European officers in the Egyptian army faced former comrades and enemies from the Napoleonic Wars on the rugged battlefields of Greece. However, once European public opinion proved to be overwhelmingly in favor of the Greeks, many Grande Armée veterans in the Egyptian service either chose to leave Egypt or refuse to fight in Greece. Although few Grande Armée veterans remained loyal to Egypt, French economic, military, and political influence continued to flourish throughout the reign of Mehmet Ali.
Mehmet Ali Pasha’s Rise to Power in Egypt
Napoleon’s Egyptian expedition dealt a devastating blow to the Mameluk rulers of Egypt, who were no match for the superior technology and tactics of the French upon their arrival in 1798. Although a province of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottomans rarely possessed any authority in Egypt, particularly following the withdrawal of the French in 1801. In the resulting struggle for power between the remaining Mameluk leaders and several other groups, an unlikely victor emerged to govern Egypt. Mehmet Ali Pasha, an Ottoman officer of Albanian descent from the Greek city of Kavala successfully outmaneuvered the Mameluks, led by British-backed Mohammed Bey al-Alfi to become Wali (governor) of Egypt in 1805.
Mehmet first arrived in Egypt as an officer in Mustafa Pasha’s ill-fated Ottoman army that met the French at the battle of Abukir in 1799. Mehmet managed to reach the safety of the Ottoman fleet while 4,000 drowned and 2,000 more lay dead on the beaches on the outskirts of Alexandria. The decisive French victory left an indelible mark on Mehmet, who realized the need to modernize the Ottoman army if it was to have any chance of defeating a European power. Napoleon of course aspired to leave his mark on the future of Egypt; little did he know an obscure officer from a vanquished opposing army not unlike himself in the final chaotic years of the French Revolution would establish Egypt’s first modern ruling dynasty. This dynasty however, ended as one scholar noted “not too gloriously with King Farouk” in the 1950s.
Immediately upon securing his position, Mehmet implemented a series of key agricultural and industrial reforms that enabled the organization of a new professional military modeled along European lines. The result of the military reforms was the al-Nizam al-Jedid or New Organization of the armed forces. The military was bolstered by the arrival of dozens of European officers from mainly France, Italy, and Spain that served as instructors. The army of peasant conscripts that took the field in Greece was trained by these European officers and commanded by Mehmet’s son Ibrahim Pasha. Naval forces were also modernized and several ships of the Egyptian fleet were constructed in England. Stalemate in the Greek War of Independence prompted Sultan Mahmud II to recognize the military power of Egypt as well as the potential threat posed by his vassal in Cairo.
European Instructors in the Egyptian Army
The conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars offered Mehmet the opportunity to acquire the necessary resources to develop the Egyptian military. Peace in Europe allowed Egypt to purchase surplus weapons, procure several English-built ships, as well as attract veterans of the Grande Armée and other European armies into Mehmet’s service.
Among the earliest veterans of the Napoleonic Wars to have an enduring impact on the developing Egyptian military was “Colonel” Joseph Sève of Lyon and formerly of the Grande Armée. Sève had ended his military career in France serving as a captain on Marshal Grouchy’s staff during the Hundred Days. Over the course of the Napoleonic Wars, Sève had served in the French navy at Trafalgar, in the hussars, and finally as an infantryman. He was wounded in several battles including Leipzig in 1813 and was a recipient of the Legion of Honor. Once described as “rough of speech, and with the manners of a grenadier,” Sève, on half-pay by the end of 1815 was never comfortable in civilian life. Dissatisfied with the Bourbon government and with little prospects in France, he traveled to Egypt and presented himself as a French colonel to Mehmet. This hardened soldier embodied the type of character that Mehmet sought to train the new conscripts for the army. Mehmet was impressed with Sève, who himself embraced Islam and took the name Suleiman Pasha al-Faransawi (The Frenchman). By late 1818, Sève or Suleiman Pasha had constructed an efficient training camp at Aswan and several others were established by 1823. In 1822, a British traveler visited one of these camps, where he witnessed a “regiment of Arabs stationed at Farisout now being instructed after the European mode…They have European muskets and bayonets and the drums are beaten à la Française, the Drum Major being a French Mameluke. The officers are French and Italian.”
Sève indeed was joined by several other former officers from European armies largely from France, Italy, and Spain. The Corsican Mari, who later became Bekir Aga, fabricated much more of his military record than Sève, though he still proved of some use to Mehmet. Mari was known as the “Corsican liar” as it was not known whether he served in the British or French army during the Napoleonic Wars. Though at one point he claimed to be a colonel in the Grande Armée, it was more likely that Mari had actually been a drummer which led to his nickname “Le Colonel Tapin.” Then again, Mari may have served in the Corsican Rangers of the British army. Regardless of the exact details of his military career, upon his arrival in Egypt, Mari was commissioned a captain of the Egyptian army with the task of drilling conscripts. Mari served in the Egyptian army’s campaigns against Wahhabi rebels in Arabia and also in Greece. Later he fought in the Mehmet’s wars against the Ottoman Empire while also serving as the prefect of police in Cairo.
Despite the rather dubious backgrounds of most of the officers that arrived in Egypt, Mehmet recognized that not every European adventurer would match Sève’s abilities though like Mari, they could still provide some use to the developing Egyptian army. He once remarked, “I know that of fifty men who come from Europe to offer me their services, forty-nine are like false jewels, but without trying them, I cannot pick out the one genuine diamond which may perhaps be among them.” This idea of finding a useful and loyal European instructor became particularly evident following Egypt’s entry into the Greek War of Independence, as a number of European officers refused to serve in the field and others simply left the country, much to Mehmet’s displeasure. Sève had therefore solidified his position as Mehmet’s favorite European instructor as he was both experienced and loyal to the regime.
The conscripts Sève and his fellow European instructors had at their disposal to mold into an effective fighting force were mostly Egyptian peasants along with some Sudanese captives and Berbers. Egyptian peasants had never been subjected to military training as troops serving in Egypt under Ottoman rule were largely Mameluks and Albanians. Conscription, though successful in essentially building the Egyptian army, was resented and fiercely resisted by the peasants. As Ibrahim Pasha himself later noted, the anger expressed by the peasants concerning conscription was understandable, as a conscript was bound to the army with no specified time frame for discharge. According to Ibrahim, conscription was “the same” as captivity, a sentiment clearly echoed by the peasants. In some instances, massive revolts erupted in response to Mehmet’s call for conscripts. This was the case in Lower Egypt in the spring of 1823, where the revolt caused Mehmet to personally suppress the disgruntled peasants with his personal guards and several batteries of artillery. A revolt the following year in Upper Egypt mobilized 30,000 people against their ruler and his unpopular policies.
Despite these difficulties, Sève had managed by the early 1820s to construct a disciplined force of regular infantry, supported by modernized artillery. Indeed, these Egyptian regulars impressed French and British observers alike. Henry Salt, a British diplomat and Egyptologist wrote in late 1823 that Sève’s Egyptians were “nearly as perfect as European troops,” though they were “somewhat inferior to the British but nearly equal to the French troops I have seen.” In 1829, as Egypt’s military power gained recognition throughout Europe, the French consul, Jean François Mimaut was pleased to see a parade of disciplined Egyptian troops returning from Greece “marching under four white flags [Bourbon France] , and to the tune of ‘Vive Henri IV.’” Sève’s vision of an Egyptian army modeled closely on that of France had indeed taken shape. Although no friend of Bourbon France, Sève through providing the basic foundation for a professional Egyptian army had assisted in cultivating the close relationship between Mehmet and France that continued to flourish for most of the century. The French government took advantage of this close relationship in an attempt to restore France’s prestige as a European power following the final defeat of Napoleon.
Bourbon France and the Military Mission to Egypt
France had not forgotten Egypt in the years following Napoleon’s arrival there in the summer of 1798. The scientific and cultural advances that resulted from the expedition as well as the legacy of glory stemming from Napoleonic propaganda left veterans of the Grande Armée with a sense of nostalgia. However, the French were interested in Egypt for reasons other than the positive aspects of Napoleon’s campaign, which of course ultimately ended in defeat at the hands of England in 1801. Bourbon France in the 1820s was eager to reassert itself as a European power in the aftermath of the fall of the First Empire and the Allied occupation of the country. After assisting in the suppression of the revolt in Spain against King Ferdinand VII, the French began to look eastward and the eastern Mediterranean in particular for a potential ally in the region.
Egypt, in the eyes of many French officials was the ideal place to restore French prestige in an area quickly gaining prominence in European affairs. Mehmet appeared to be pro-French and his reforms echoed some of those implemented by Napoleon. One key veteran of the Napoleonic French government in reintroducing Bourbon France to Egypt was Bernardino Drovetti. Drovetti was an Italian that had served Napoleon since the French invasion of his native Piedmont in 1796. His loyalty was rewarded through obtaining several government posts in Piedmont before traveling to Egypt as France’s consul in Alexandria in 1803.
From the onset of his tenure as French consul, Drovetti was convinced Mehmet Ali was destined to rule Egypt and thus stressed the necessity of French interaction with the new Egyptian Wali. Drovetti himself became a close advisor to Mehmet and was instrumental in defending Egypt from the British invasion of 1807. Drovetti’s assistance contributed to Mehmet’s positive view of French instructors in the nascent Egyptian army. Over the years, Drovetti maintained ties with both Mehmet and the French government, even after the fall of Napoleonic France. It was Drovetti’s reports from Egypt that largely influenced the French government in the early 1820s to assemble a military mission.
A contingent of 14 French officers under General Pierre Boyer was dispatched in 1824 to achieve France’s aims in the region while Egypt was embroiled in the Ottoman war effort against the Greek rebels. Boyer and most of the officers were veterans of Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt and were employed as instructors by Mehmet like the other Europeans in his service. The objective of the Boyer mission as it became known was essentially to complete the training process initiated by men like Sève. This mission initially achieved some success, as officers contributed to training recruits in military schools and also served in field units. By 1826, the Egyptian army units sent to Greece had between five and six European instructors attached to each regiment. However, Boyer and Mehmet often disputed what type of instructors the Egyptian army needed to complete the process of developing a European force. This was the first sign of tension though several other factors contributed to the sudden end of the Boyer mission. Mehmet’s hostility to the French officer’s suggestions contradicted what Boyer had been told before departing for Egypt, as an official remarked “the interests of Egypt are so linked to those of France that to serve one is to serve them both.”
The military mission was plagued by this conflict between Boyer and Mehmet, petty disputes between the various European officers in the Egyptian service, as well as French public opinion. Boyer and other French officers frequently clashed with Italian and Spanish adventurers in search of advancement and wealth in Egypt. According to Boyer, these men were not officers, but rather “refugees…men without respect for authority, without fidelity, law and honor.” The news from France was also unsettling to some French officers in Egypt. French public opinion by 1826, like much of Europe, was firmly in favor of Greek independence. Therefore, many were upset that the army which aimed to crush the Greek cause was not only modeled on and trained by Frenchman, but also commanded by Grande Armée veterans like Sève. Indeed, the French press believed France’s presence in the Egyptian army was so great that the army that took the field in Greece was labeled as “Gallo-Egyptian.” This became increasingly uncomfortable for the French officers in the mission following the early successes of the Egyptian army and the news of excessive brutality against the Greek civilian population. Consequently, many European officers in the Egyptian service, including General Boyer simply refused to travel to Greece or deserted once it became clear that Europe was strongly in favor of the Greeks. Despite his refusal to serve in Greece, Boyer nonetheless carried out French policy in Egypt until he was dismissed by Mehmet in late 1826.
Ibrahim Pasha’s Campaigns in Greece 1824-1828
Indeed what altered the relationship between Mehmet Ali and many Europeans was the Greek War of Independence. The Greek revolt, which began in early 1821, was immediately championed by the renowned British poet, Lord Byron. Many of Byron’s fellow philhellenes or “friends of Greece” began to organize financial and military assistance for the embattled Greeks against the Ottoman Empire. Early Greek successes including the capture of the capital of the Peloponnese, Tripoli in October 1821 infuriated Sultan Mahmud II and prompted his reconsideration of the Ottoman war effort.
The Sultan in Constantinople recognized the potential of the Egyptian army and was impressed with its quality and durability during the campaigns in Arabia and Sudan fought on his behalf. Such success though, was viewed with a combination of suspicion and awe in Constantinople. However, the shortcomings of the Ottoman army in Greece necessitated a successful invasion of the Peloponnese by the Egyptians, as at least at the moment, Mehmet was still a loyal vassal. Unfortunately for the Sultan, Mehmet was well aware that the Ottoman war effort in Greece depended on Egyptian intervention. Mehmet himself did not consider the Greek rebels as enemies; in fact they were assisting in his ultimate objective of weakening the Ottoman Empire and securing additional territory. Thus, with no pressing quarrels with the Greeks himself, Mehmet sought considerable territorial compensation in return for assisting the Ottomans.
The year 1824 presented an opportunity for the Sultan to bring about a swift conclusion to the rebellion as the Greek rebels were embroiled in a civil war and Mehmet had been convinced to commit his al-Nizam al-Jedid in return for obtaining the Peloponnese for his son Ibrahim Pasha as well as Crete for himself. Although he had agreed to enter the war on behalf of the Ottomans, Mehmet allowed agents from the revolutionary society, the Filiki Eteria or “Friendly Society” that initiated the Greek War of Independence to operate in Egypt in an effort to make his services to the Ottomans appear even more valuable. In July 1824, a force of 8,000 troops and 1,000 horses under Ibrahim Pasha and Admiral Muharram Pasha left Alexandria for Bodrum, Turkey to rendezvous with the Ottoman fleet.
The commander of the al-Nizam al-Jedid was Ibrahim Pasha, who like his father was quickly attracting attention in Europe. Ibrahim was an efficient commander with remarkable leadership ability compared to his Ottoman counterparts and fellow Egyptian officers. Ibrahim’s first significant field command came in Arabia following the death of his brother Tusun Pasha in 1816. Although a harsh disciplinarian, Ibrahim nonetheless was adored by his men for exposing himself to the same hardships and dangers as the peasant conscripts. On numerous occasions during the campaigns in Greece, Ibrahim led his army into battle from the front shouting “Yallah ya awlad” (C’mon boys).
Ibrahim Pasha’s second-in-command was Suleiman Pasha or Joseph Sève as many philhellenes would have recognized. Indeed, many philhellenes were former comrades of those European officers in the Egyptian service. These men included the leader of the French philhellenes, Charles Nicolas Fabvier, himself a decorated veteran of the Grande Armée. Whether they were allies or enemies during the Napoleonic Wars, these veterans found themselves on opposite sides in Greece. The campaign began in February 1825, when Ibrahim initiated a series of landings in which a force of 10,000 troops, 1,000 cavalry, and a number of artillery seized Methoni (Modon) in the southwestern Peloponnese unopposed.
From there, Ibrahim launched a campaign beginning in March 1825 to recapture the Peloponnese from the Greek rebels. The disciplined Egyptian army trained by Sève consistently routed Greek forces and proceeded to destroy many villages throughout the Peloponnese. By the end of 1825, Ibrahim had recaptured Tripoli and much of the region. The Egyptian army also left a considerable path of destruction throughout the Peloponnese and enslaved thousands of Greeks in response to the guerrilla conflict conducted by Greek rebels. The overwhelming success and brutality of the campaign led to a rumor of “an evil of so extraordinary a character” that eventually brought military intervention from Britain, France, and Russia in 1827. This rumor that originated in Russian diplomatic circles stated that Ibrahim would slaughter or enslave the entire Greek population of the Peloponnese and repopulate the area with Egyptians. Despite the unrealistic nature of the rumor, many Europeans were convinced by reports of the Egyptian army’s brutality that such a situation was not unimaginable. Indeed, Greek slaves abounded in Cairo and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, which alarmed most Europeans, including the British who had recently banned the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Thus, as Ibrahim continued his campaigns in Greece, the great powers began to consider a military response to ensure the plans outlined in the rumor could not be brought to fruition.
Although such rumors influenced the intervention of Britain, Russia, and France on behalf of the Greeks, Russian foreign policy ultimately prompted the decision to take action. Britain and Russia were at odds over the future of the Ottoman Empire and the eastern Mediterranean region in particular, and Russia by 1826 was preparing for another conflict in its long series of wars with the Ottoman Empire. The British sought to avert this war that had the potential to cripple the Ottomans and leave the entire region in Russian hands, and did briefly avoid a Russo-Turkish conflict in favor of forging an agreement to blockade the Egyptian army and starve Ibrahim out of the Peloponnese.
Ibrahim meanwhile continued to rampage the Peloponnese and moved into central Greece to besiege the Greek stronghold of Missolonghi in 1826. Command of the Egyptian-controlled areas of the Peloponnese was entrusted to Sève as Ibrahim marched north to Missolonghi, where he was joined by an Ottoman army. Missolonghi was a fortress defended by a large number of philhellenes in addition to Greek rebels and was the place where Lord Byron succumbed to a fever in the spring of 1825. The combined force of Ottomans and Egyptians slaughtered the retreating garrison after a prolonged siege forced the starving defenders to attempt a breakout. Among the dead philhellenes were several veterans of the Napoleonic Wars, including a former Prussian cavalry officer von Dittmar.
Following the fall of Missolonghi, the Ottoman and Egyptian forces captured Athens in early 1827. Although much of Greece at this point was under Ottoman or Egyptian control, a combined fleet of Britain, France, and Russia had set sail for Greece to prevent further atrocities on the part of Ibrahim’s army. The commander of the fleet, British Admiral Sir Edward Codrington was faced with a delicate situation as no state of war existed between any of the allied nations and the Ottoman Empire, though many officers clamored for action on behalf of the Greeks. Ibrahim’s refusal to comply with demands for the immediate cessation of hostilities and his renewal of destructive raids on the Greek population initiated the decisive conflict in October 1827.
Codrington, who had served as one of Nelson’s captains at Trafalgar led the Allied fleet against the combined Ottoman-Egyptian fleet at Navarino. Despite the numerical superiority of the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet, Codrington brought the fleet within range of the enemy guns and prepared for battle. The British contingent drew close to the Ottoman fleet while the French and Russians approached the Egyptians. Shortly before the battle, Codrington quoted Nelson: “No captain can do very wrong who places his ship alongside that of an enemy.” According to the captain of the British frigate, the Dartmouth, the Turks opened fire with muskets which then initiated the fateful battle of Navarino. The battle was a decisive victory for Codrington and the Allied fleet, while nearly the entire Egyptian navy coveted by Mehmet lay at the bottom of sea.
Navarino marked the turning point in the Greek War of Independence, as neither the Ottomans nor Ibrahim launched another major campaign and final peace agreements followed in 1830. Although French ships participated in the battle, the French government continued to invest in Mehmet’s regime. Clearly as Boyer had been told before the military mission departed, France’s interests were closely tied to the situation in Egypt. French assistance allowed Mehmet to rapidly rebuild the military from the decisive defeat at Navarino. France then frequently urged Mehmet to declare independence from the Ottomans, particularly after the Egyptian ruler was denied compensation following the disastrous outcome of the Greek revolt for the Ottoman Empire.
No longer was Mehmet inclined to take orders from the “pig-headed Sultan” in Constantinople, who gambled away his prized fleet at Navarino. Mehmet coveted Syria, which eventually resulted in two wars against the Ottomans from 1832-1841. Despite decisive Egyptian victories, the European powers (with the exception of France) led by Britain intervened and ensured Mehmet would not seize Constantinople and consequently destroy the Ottoman Empire. Although he had not eclipsed the Ottoman Sultan as the power of the eastern Mediterranean, Mehmet at his death in 1849 had firmly established a ruling dynasty in Egypt that continued until the 1950s.
Sève once again changed his name to Soliman Pasha and married a Greek captive from the war who converted to Islam named Maria Mariam Hanem. Upon his return to Egypt, Sève continued to train and command Egyptian troops. He distinguished himself at the battle of Nezib against the Ottomans in 1839, and later retired to his palace on the Nile. In his retirement, Sève was called “the most powerful man in Egypt, the conqueror of Nezib, the terror of Constantinople.” Long after his death, Sève’s family continued to play a role in Egyptian history, as his great-granddaughter married King Fuad and was the mother of the last reigning Egyptian monarch, King Farouk. Also, one of downtown Cairo’s main avenues was formerly named in his honor.
Sève’s career illustrated the French impact on the formation of the Egyptian army that caught Europe’s attention during the Greek War of Independence and in later conflicts against the Ottomans. Despite the unpopularity of Egyptian intervention in Greece in the eyes of most European officers and the French government, French influence remained prominent in Egypt throughout the reign of Mehmet Ali and his early successors. Although the Boyer mission was unsuccessful, the French government continued to sponsor military missions and also invited Egyptian students to study in France. France’s presence in numerous aspects of Egyptian affairs was so great the British consul in 1847 lamented “every department of the public service is more or less in the hands of the French.” France as late as the mid-nineteenth century indeed had not entirely abandoned Napoleon’s ambitions for Egypt.
Al-Sayyid Marsot, Afaf Lutfi. Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Bass, Gary J. Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention. New York: Knopf, 2008.
Brown, Frederick. Flaubert: A Biography. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.
Dodwell, Henry. The Founder of Modern Egypt: A Study of Muhammad ‘Ali. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967.
Dunn, John P. “Missions or Mercenaries? European Advisors in Mehmed Ali’s Egypt; 1815-1848,” in, Military Advising & Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815-2007, edited by Donald J. Stoker. New York: Routledge, 2008.
Elgood, P.G. Lt. Col., The Transit of Egypt. New York: Russell & Russell, 1969.
Fahmy, Khaled. All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Herold, J. Christopher. Bonaparte in Egypt. London: Pen & Sword, 2005.
Jasanoff, Maya. Edge of Empire: Lives, Culture, & Conquest in the East, 1750-1850. New York: Vintage Books, 2005.
Karsh, Efraim and Inari Karsh. Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1923. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.
Manley, Deborah, and Peta Rée. Henry Salt: Artist, Traveller, Diplomat, Egyptologist. London: Libri Publications, 2001.
McGregor, Andrew James. A Military History of Modern Egypt: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006.
Schom, Alan, Napoleon Bonaparte. New York: HarperCollins, 1997.
Silvera, Alain, “The First Egyptian Student Mission to France under Muhammad Ali,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.16. No.2. (May) 1980.
St. Clair, William. That Greece Might Still Be Free: The Philhellenes in the Greek War of Independence. Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2008.
Vatikiotis, P.J. The History of Egypt from Muhammad Ali to Mubarak, third edition. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.
 Fahmy, Khaled. All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. p. 80.
 Schom, Alan, Napoleon Bonaparte. New York: HarperCollins, 1997. p.183.
 Herold, J.C. Bonaparte in Egypt. London: Pen & Sword, 2005. p. 319.
 Elgood, P.G. Lt. Col., The Transit of Egypt. New York: Russell & Russell, 1969. p.51.
 Dunn, John P. “Missions or Mercenaries? European Advisors in Mehmed Ali’s Egypt; 1815-1848,” in, Military Advising & Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815-2007, edited by Donald J. Stoker. New York: Routledge, 2008. p.14.
 Vatikiotis, P.J. The History of Egypt from Muhammad Ali to Mubarak, third edition. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. p. 57. Silvera, Alain. “The First Egyptian Student Mission to France under Muhammad Ali,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.16. No.2. (May) 1980. p. 6.8>
 Jasanoff, Maya. Edge of Empire: Lives, Culture, & Conquest in the East, 1750-1850. New York: Vintage Books, 2005. p. 282.
 Dunn, John P. “Missions or Mercenaries.” p. 16.
 Ibid; p. 11.
 Fahmy, Khaled. All the Pasha’s Men. p. 262.
 Ibid., P. 99-100.
 Manley, Deborah, and Peta Rée. Henry Salt: Artist, Traveller, Diplomat, Egyptologist. London: Libri Publications, 2001. p. 220.
 Jasanoff, Maya. Edge of Empire, p. 286.
 Ibid; p. 228-229.
 Ibid; p. 230.
 Dunn, John P. “Missions or Mercenaries?” p. 16.
 St. Clair, William. That Greece Might Still Be Free: The Philhellenes in the Greek War of Independence. Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2008. p. 274.
 Dunn, John P. “Missions or Mercenaries?” p. 17.
 Jasanoff, Maya. Edge of Empire, p. 282.
 St. Clair, William. That Greece Might Still Be Free. p. 258-259.
 Ibid; p. 276.
 Karsh, Efraim and Inari Karsh. Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1923. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999. p. 31.
 McGregor, Andrew James. A Military History of Modern Egypt: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006. p. 91.
 Fahmy, Khaled. All the Pasha’s Men, p. 178.
 Al-Sayyid Marsot, Afaf Lutfi. Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984. p. 83.
 St. Clair, William. That Greece Might Still Be Free. p. 245.
 McGregor, Andrew James. A Military History of Modern Egypt. p. 93.
 Bass, Gary J. Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention. New York: Knopf, 2008. p. 126-131.
 Dodwell, Henry. The Founder of Modern Egypt: A Study of Muhammad ‘Ali. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967. p. 79.
 Ibid; p. 81.
 Ibid; p. 76.
 Bass, Gary J. Freedom’s Battle. p. 110.
 St. Clair, William. That Greece Might Still Be Free. p. 242.
 Bass, Gary J. Freedom’s Battle. p.143.
 Ibid; p. 144.
 Jasanoff, Maya. Edge of Empire, p. 285.
 Dodwell, Henry. The Founder of Modern Egypt. p. 93.
 Brown, Frederick. Flaubert: A Biography. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007. p. 237.
 Dunn, John P. “Missions or Mercenaries?” p. 18.
Placed on the Napoleon Series: January 2012
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