

The Napoleon Series

The Campaign of 1814: Chapter 20, Part I

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THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814

(after the documents of the imperial and royal archives of Vienna)

THE ALLIED CAVALRY

DURING THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814

CHAPTER XX.

OPERATIONS OF THE AUSTRIAN ARMY OF THE SOUTH, FROM 3 MARCH 1814 TO THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN.

3 March 1814. --Positions, movements, and general situation of the French and Austrian armies. --Before returning to the account of the events of war which took place in the valleys of the Saône, Rhone, and Isère during the month of March, 1814, and until the cessation of hostilities, it is necessary to summarize in a few lines the situation on 3 March of the armies employed in that part of the theater of war.

Anxious about the progress made by the French, both on the side of Geneva and in the Jura, fearing for his communications with his principal line of operations, wishing at all costs to cover his left wing and his rear, Prince Schwarzenberg had, one will remember, charged Lieutenant Field-Marshal Bianchi with the direction of operations entrusted to the Austrian troops on the right bank of the Saône. He had also ordered the General of Cavalry Crown Prince of Hesse-Homburg, to whom he had entrusted the chief command of the Army of the South, to press the march of the Austrian reserves and contingents belonging to the VIth Corps of the German Confederation, whose columns, coming from Basel, were to proceed to Besançon and Dole.

In order to free Geneva, the Generalissimo had ordered Bianchi to leave before Auxonne only one of the brigades of Lieutenant Field-Marshal Wimpffen, and to employ the remainder of this division, which would march on the left bank of the Saône, .

On 3 March, the Austrian troops began their movement in three columns. On the right bank of the Saône, the former Bianchi Division, now under the command of General Bakony, went from Dijon to Côteaux and that of Count Ignatius Hardegg, from Côteaux to Seurre. The division of the Prince Wied-Runkel was at the same time moving himself from Dijon to Beaune, and there formed a union with the division of Lieutenant Field-Marshal Lederer, whose advanced guard, the division of Scheither, stationed at Chalon-sur-Saône, sent parties forward from his fore front on Tournus, covered his right in the direction of Autun, and was illuminated for on his left by scouts sent on the left bank of the Saône to Louhans.

All these troops, belonging to the Austrian Ist Corps, formed the right column.

In order to threaten the right of Augereau at Lons-le-Saunier, Lieutenant Field-Marshal Count Wimpffen, whose division was the center column, had left 2,500 men under General Rothkirch und Panthen in front of Auxonne, assembled his other brigade at Moissey and began his march towards the Doubs. Finally, Lieutenant Field-Marshal Prince Alois Liechtenstein was preparing to reinforce the left-hand column (Crown Prince of Hesse-Homburg) with all the troops whose presence in Besançon were not absolutely indispensable. He had, for this purpose, pushed on the side of Arbois the detachment of Colonel Wieland,¹ and charged him to observe the movements of Augereau.

On the extreme left of the Austrian lines, Bubna, shut up in Geneva, had destroyed the bridges of the Arve.

As he had sent to the Minister of War by his letter of 2 March,² Augereau, still timid and always undecided, had waited for the capture or evacuation of Geneva to unite his army, to advance to the Franche-Comte and try to raise the siege of Besançon. Operating without a definite plan, with no definite purpose, discouraging his generals and fatiguing his troops by the constant dispatch of contradictory orders, he had begun, while settling with a part of his army at Lons-le-Saunier, to unite generals Marchand and Dessaix, who were in charge of the taking of Geneva, first the Bardet Brigade, and then the division of Musnier, which had passed as far as Les Rousses, and had penetrated as far as Saint Cergues in the canton of Vaud.

On 3 March, Dessaix had again summoned Bubna to surrender.

The Austrian general had this time responded to this summons by charging Fabry, one of the councilors of the prefecture of Leman, to declare that he would leave the city if he was not rescued within two days. At that moment Geneva was almost entirely surrounded on all sides: on the road to Lons-le-Saunier by the Musnier Division in march on Nyons, and the advanced guard at Saint-Cergues, on the road of Lyons by General Bardet, by that of Chambéry by the troops of Dessaix, who were stationed on the plateau of Aire, having his extreme right at Viry, and on his left the brigade of Pouchelon.

Without discussing here the general plan of the operation of Augereau, which the Emperor had authorized, it is true, to march on Lons-le-Saunier, but only after the retaking of Geneva, there is no doubt that after detaching Musnier, it was at least necessary to let him complete his movement, and threaten Geneva by the northern shore of the lake. Far from doing so, on the 2nd of March, Augereau sent the General to march back, to resume the route he had followed, and to march immediately to Saint-Laurent and Champagnole, the divisions of Pannetier and Digeon, which seemed to him too weak to beat the Austrian IInd Corps of Prince Alois Liechtenstein.

Not satisfied with these measures, which seemed to him to be insufficient, abandoning, so to speak, from one day to the next, any serious attempt against Geneva, concluding that it was impossible to capture this city with carelessness and casualness equal to the lightness which had made him admit a few days earlier that the mere appearance of his troops under the walls of Geneva would be sufficient to persuade it to decide either to capitulate or to evacuate the city, he took too tardily to concentrate forces which he should never have disseminated .

But as soon as Augereau had modified his plan, as soon as he had recalled to him Musnier and Bardet, Bubna hastened to break off the negotiations. The resolution of Augereau was therefore all the more inexplicable, since the

¹The composition of Colonel Wieland's detachment: 2 battalions and 4 squadrons of Blankenstein Hussars.

²Augereau to the Minister of War, 2 March. (*Archives of the War.*)

Marshal would have had time to take Geneva, to leave a garrison there, then to make cross again the Rhône to Musnier and to Bardet, at Seyssel and at Bellegarde, to come in three or four marches to take a position ahead of Lyons and to precede the Allies there. In a word, as Du Casse says, in his *Accurate History of the Operations of the Army of the Rhône*, the conduct of Augereau from one end to the other is of a nature to inspire more than bitter retaliations.

4 March 1814. --Augereau prepares to march on Besançon, and recalls the troops of Generals Musnier, Bardet, and Pouchelon. --Among other things, at the moment when the Marshal resigned himself at last to execute the orders of the Emperor, it was in any case impossible for him to repair the faults he had committed. Ignorant of the movements and preparations of the Austrians, he expected to begin his movement on Franche-Comte, on the morning of 4 March. But his army, instead of being concentrated, occupied a long line from Lons-le-Saunier, where for some days he had already established his headquarters, to Poligny, Saint-Laurent, and Morez.

Not daring to accentuate his movement towards Besançon and from there to the Haut-Rhin, without being sure of being supported, then joined by the troops he had detached from the side of Switzerland, now convinced that Bubna, believed hitherto incapable of resisting, was in a position to hold at Geneva, he sent, on 4 March, to the Generals Bardet and Pouchelon the order to proceed to Bourg to Lons-le-Saunier.³ At the same time he made known to General Marchand the motives which prevented him from leaving too many of his people at the blockade of Geneva, which were to be secured only by the troops of that general and those of Dessaix.

He also announced that he could be all the more easily able to serve Bubna in Geneva, that he would be strengthened by the troops available in Dauphine, by a battalion sent by the Viceroy of Italy, and by the 6,000 to 8,000 reinforcements promised by Prince Borghese and who had to leave Turin.⁴

Movements of Bianchi. --Better informed than his adversary, Bianchi had observed that the reports furnished by his vanguard were absolutely accurate. It was certain that Augereau had few people on the Saône, wishing on the other hand to give to the Austrian reserves of the Crown Prince of Hesse-Homburg, who, though they had forced their march, were only then at Baume-les-Dames, the time to enter the line, and at least assure them the possibility of supporting the troops of Prince Alois Liechtenstein under Besançon, Bianchi decided to continue his march on Mâcon in order to force Augereau to stop.

The 1st Corps remained during the day of the 4th on its positions on the right bank of the Saône, with the exception of the Ignatius Hardegg Division, which, operating alone on the left bank of the river, was to seek to connect itself with the troops of Wimpffen and Colonel Wieland. After leaving Seurre on the morning of the 4 March, Ignatius Hardegg stopped at Mervans, but his advanced guard occupied the same evening Louhans, and set out in the direction of Lons-le-Saunier, while the parties of Scheither came from Tournus to Cuisery and scouted the road to Cuiseaux.⁵

On the left and behind Hardegg, Wimpffen had crossed the Doubs at Dole and pushed on the road leading to Poligny and Arbois, as far as Villette-lès-Dole.

Battle of Poligny. --Expecting the French troops to pronounce their advance, Colonel Wieland had, on the morning of the 3rd evacuated Arbois. But as the day had passed quietly, he had returned the same day at 7 o'clock in the evening. Charged to reconnoiter the positions of Augereau and to connect with the column of Wimpffen, Wieland

³ Augereau to General Bardet, Lons-le-Saunier, 4 March, and General Bardet to General Marchand, Farges, 4 March. (*Archives of the War.*)

⁴ Augereau to Marchand, Lons-le-Saunier, 4 March. (*Archives of the War.*)

500 men sent from Italy by Prince Camille at the urging of M. de Saint-Vallier had strengthened General Marchand at Carouge; but on the 2nd of March the order arrived from Turin to send back to Prince Camille the 500 men who returned to the road to Piedmont on 3 March.

⁵ STÄRKE, Eintheilung und Tagesbegebenheiten der Haupt-Armee im Monate März. (*K. K. Kriegs Archiv.*, III, 1.)

had left Arbois on 4 March at daybreak and attacked at 7 o'clock in the morning, ahead of Poligny, the outposts of General Gudin, who, immediately forming his brigade, overthrew the Austrians, and pursued them as far as Arbois, after having caused them to lose 300 or 400 men, and having taken from them a hundred prisoners. Wieland, wounded in battle and obliged to hand over the command to Colonel Leiningen, succeeded in rallying his troops only near Salins.⁶

5 March, 1814. --Augereau renounces the movement on Franche-Comte, and retreats to Lyons. --At the moment when Gudin informed him of the advantages he had gained, at the moment when he was preparing to move forward, Augereau learned in the evening of the movement of the corps of Bianchi on Chalon, the approach of the Austrian reserves of the Crown Prince of Hesse-Homburg and the appearance of Austrian detachments in Louhans and in the direction of Bletterans. Couriers destined for Bubna and Prince Alois Liechtenstein, intercepted by his cavalry, confirmed this grave news, while on the other hand he was informed of the passage to Tournus, on the left bank of the Saône, of parties⁷ which, spreading on his left flank, seemed to want to threaten his communications and to mask the movement of the columns of Bianchi. This news revived the fears of the Marshal for Lyons. Renouncing his expedition to Franche-Comte, just as he had renounced the retaking of Geneva, he resolved to immediately reunite the divisions of Musnier and Pannetier and his cavalry, and resolved to march against Bianchi. But at the moment of undertaking these new operations, Augereau had to choose between two paths: one, the only rational and useful one, was to go straight at the Austrians by Tournus and Mâcon and to force the passage of the Saône on the one of these points; the other, to which he should have resigned himself only in the event that the divisions of Bianchi had already gone past Mâcon and taken a considerable head start upon him, consisted, on the contrary, to make the forces unite around Lons-le-Saunier retreat on Lyons, by the road to Bourg. In spite of the obvious disadvantages and dangers of such a movement which allowed Bianchi to continue without difficulty his march along the right bank of the Saône, it was to this latter path that Augereau gave preference. He flattered himself, therefore, that he would take his adversary in the rear, and believed that he had parried at once by dividing his forces once more, and by prescribing to General Bardet, whom he recalled for this purpose from Geneva to Bourg, to make a false attack upon Mâcon.⁸

This inconceivable and deplorable resolution, which was to irrevocably compromise the fate of the whole campaign, received its instant execution. It was evident, however, that had Augereau succeeded in forcing the passage on the right bank of the Saône, even at Mâcon, in case the movement on Tournus had seemed too hazardous to him, the presence on this point of a French army would have given a new impulse to the painfully compressed uprising of these regions, and especially to the Charolais, and would have given the marshal the advantage of choosing a good position on the very line of march of the Austrians. But the fear of being disturbed in his movement on Mâcon by Hardegg and Wimpffen, posted on his left flank, prevailed over these essential considerations. On the 5th of March, Augereau, collecting the bulk of his forces at Lons-le-Saunier, and recalling the brigade of General Gudin, as well as the posts established on the side of Sellières, ordered this general, who was to form his rear guard to take up a position at Château-Chalon, and to inform him of what was passing on the side of Bletterans.⁹

Influence of the resolutions of Augereau on the situation before Geneva. --The resolution taken by Augereau could not, moreover, have occurred at a worse moment. The weakening of the troops which operated against Bubna and Klebelsberg, as a consequence of the singular direction given by the Duke of Castiglione on the movement of his retreat, was to compel General Marchand to renounce serious attacks upon Geneva at the very moment when they appeared to be needed and obliged him to confine himself to blockading a city whose commander had just

⁶Augereau to the Minister of War, Lons-le-Saunier, 5 March. (*Archives of the War.*)

⁷Augereau claims in his report to the Minister; Lyons, 9 March (*Archives of the War*), "that a swarm of light troops, most of them Cossacks (a sort of troops who had not yet appeared in this country), crossed the Saône at Tournus." The Marshal was very ill informed, or committed a voluntary error. Tournus had only the scouts of Scheither, and the corps of Bianchi was exclusively composed of Austrian troops.

⁸Augereau to the Minister of War, Lyon, 9 March. (*Archives of the War.*)

⁹Augereau to General Pannetier, Lons-le-Saunier, 5 March, 2 o'clock in the morning. (*Archives of the War.*)

demanded a delay ending on 7 March, and at the end of which he would probably have evacuated the city if the besiegers had not been forced by circumstances, to alter their attitude.¹⁰

Obliged to take the measures necessary to resist a bombardment, Bubna was all the more worried for his rear, from which he had been forced to detach from his people to repress the increasingly frequent attempts to raise the country of Gex. On all sides the national insurrection was making progress and gaining ground. The populations of the departments of the Ain, the Jura, the Saône-et-Loire, and the Mont-Blanc were under arms and attacked at all times the posts and detachments of the Allies. But to the great surprise of Bubna, instead of the attacks he expected, of the bombardment which he had thought imminent, the whole day passed without the slightest incident.¹¹

Movements of the troops of the Crown Prince of Hesse Hombourg. --On the other hand, on the morning of the 5th, the Crown Prince of Hesse-Homburg had received notice of the defeat of Wieland the day before, and the dispatch by which the Generalissimo informed him of the movements prescribed to Bianchi ordering him to begin without delay the operations against Augereau.¹² Troubled by the bad news from Geneva, by the reports informing him of the continual sorties of the garrisons of Besançon and Auxonne, by the disadvantageous outcome of the combat at Poligny, convinced that Augereau was going to take advantage of his momentary numerical superiority to vigorously accentuate his offensive movement, he decided to march in two columns, on one side by Dole, on the other by Arbois and Poligny on Lons-le-Saunier, possibly joining Bianchi or of going to give a hand to Wimpffen and Ignatius Hardegg. To this end he had ordered the Austrian reserves, on the point of arriving at Dole, to proceed by the high road against the left wing of the French position; the Prince of Coburg¹³ to leave Salins with the troops drawn from the IInd Corps, and to march by Arbois and Poligny against the front of this position.

Movements and positions of the Austrian Ist Corps (Bianchi). --Before deciding to take the offensive and to begin operations, Bianchi had decided to take advantage of the day of 5 March to mass around Chalon-sur-Saône the three divisions Bakony, Wied-Runkel and Lederer and to establish in narrow cantonments which he intended to occupy until the arrival of the other columns at his level. General Scheither, who served him as a vanguard, and whose main body occupied Tournus, advanced somewhat to the east of the left bank of the Saône, while strong detachments, charged with covering the right of the Ist Corps, went to Saint-Leger, to Couches, and to Autun.

The flying corps of Lieutenant-Colonel Menninger (a battalion and two squadrons) was sent to Saint-Gengoux-le-Royal to drive out the partisans of Damas who two days before had undertaken at Saint-Boil an ambush of an Austrian reconnaissance, had killed or wounded 15 men and made about twenty prisoners.¹⁴

¹⁰"I presume," writes Augereau, from Saint-Amour, on 6 March, to General Bardet, "that Bubna, who, according to the letters I had intercepted, relied heavily on the diversion of Bianchi, sought to distract General Marchand by asking until the 7th of this month to evacuate Geneva." (Correspondence of Augereau, *Archives of the War*.)

¹¹STÄRKE, Eintheilung und Tagesbegebenheiten der Haupt-Armee im Monate März. (*K. K. Kriegs Archiv.*, III, 1.)

¹²The Prince of Schwarzenberg to the Crown Prince of Hesse-Homburg, Bar-sur-Aube, 4 March. (*K. K. Kriegs Archiv.*, III, 82.)

¹³Composition of the detachment of the Major-General Prince of Coburg: five battalions of infantry; 4 squadrons of the Archduke Francis Cuirassiers; 6 squadrons of the Archduke John Dragoons; 2 squadrons of the Kienmayer Hussars.

¹⁴STÄRKE, Eintheilung und Tagesbegebenheiten der Haupt-Armee im Monate März. (*K. K. Kriegs Archiv.*, II, 1), and the report of G. of Damas, leader of the partisans of the 19th Military Division, to the Minister of War, 4 March. (*Archives of the War*.)

On the left bank of the Saône, Count Ignatius Hardegg had advanced from Mervans as far as Saint-Germain-aux-Bois and had stretched out towards Lons-le-Saunier as far as Bletterans, leaving Wimpffen stopped in the evening at Villiers-Robert.¹⁵

6 and 7 March 1814. --Immobility of the troops of Bianchi. --Organization of the Austrian Army of the South. --The different fractions of the Ist Corps remained completely motionless in their cantonments of Chalon during the day of 6 March. The column of Wimpffen continued its march alone, and pushed as far as Sellières, while the Crown Prince of Hesse Hombourg arrived at Dole.¹⁶ The Allies devoted the greater part of the following day to the organization of the Army of the South. Placed under the command of the Crown Prince of Hesse-Hombourg, this army consisted of two corps charged with operating against Lyons (62 battalions, 74 squadrons, and 13 batteries), representing a force of about 43,200 men.¹⁷

Movements and positions of Augereau. --On the evening of the 6th, Augereau, having left Lons-le-Saunier on the 6th at five o'clock in the morning, had reached Saint-Amour, whence he had again sent General Bardet a formal order to rejoin him by Bourg, taking with him the Pouchelon Brigade.¹⁸ The next day, 7 March, the bulk of his army was at Bourg, while General Bardet set out by forced marches, leaving only a hundred men at Fort l'Écluse.¹⁹

Neither the representations of General Marchand who had vainly begged him to delay the departure of Bardet and Pouchelon²⁰ for a few days, nor the immobility of his adversaries, nor the assurance of the approach of reinforcements sent from Italy, nothing could succeed in modifying the ideas which Augereau had formed of the

¹⁵STÄRKE, Eintheilung und Tagesbegebenheiten der Haupt-Armee im Monate März. (*K. K. Kriegs Archiv.*, II, 1.)

¹⁶ Prince of Schwarzenberg, daily report to the Emperor of Austria, 6 March. (*Ibid.*, III, 111).

¹⁷According to the *Tagesbegebenheiten* (*Ibid.*, III, 1), the Army of the South was to consist of 99 battalions and 126 squadrons, including the reinforcements still on the march. On 7 March, the Crown Prince of Hesse Homburg had, for the operations against Lyons, the Austrian Ist Corps of Bianchi, composed of the 1st Division of Lederer (Scheitherr Brigade), and the 2nd Division of Bianchi replaced by Bakony (brigades of Retsey and Quallenberg), 3rd Division, Prince of Wied-Runkel (Salins Brigade), and the Wimpffen Division (Gall, Haugwitz and Mumb Brigades), and the corps of Field Marshal Lieutenant Prince Philip of Hesse-Homburg, comprising the 1st Division of Prince Emile of Hesse (brigades of Folenius, Möser and Fürstenwerther); the 2nd division Wartensleben (brigade Kuttalek), and finally the division of Ignatius Hardegg (brigades Henri Hardegg and the Prince of Cobourg).

¹⁸"Whether or not Geneva is taken at the time you receive this letter, you will come and join me by Bourg, where you will find new orders, and you will bring General Pouchelon and his troops. See also General Bardet to General Marchand, Farges, 6 March, and Marchand to Bardet, Carouge, 6 March. (*Ibid.*)

¹⁹General Bardet to General Marchand, Farges, 7 March. (*Ibid.*)

²⁰General Marchand, writing on 7 March from Carouge to Augereau, said to him: "It is very unfortunate that General Bardet leaves us to join you. I am convinced that after three days of attack on our side, Geneva would have been forced to surrender. I hope that your Excellency will not disapprove of keeping General Pouchelon until the arrival of the reinforcements coming from Mount Cenis. If, after the departure of General Bardet, General Pouchelon left us, we might risk being chased on Chambéry." (*Archives of the War.*)

As General Marchand wrote to the Comte de Saint-Vallier, Marshal Augereau sent him, on 7 March, the order to send General Pouchelon.

In the *postscript* of his letter to Saint-Vallier, General Marchand adds: "I am certainly afraid that after being obliged to fall back on Frangy in order not to compromise my troops. I have just concentrated with General Dessaix, and it is probable that we shall proceed to Frangy *to have a good position, whereas here it is extremely extended.*" As General Marchand had written on 5 March: "It is in front of Frangy that the only good position in which we can think of maintaining ourselves, if the enemy, seeing us so weakened, takes the offensive."

situation, nothing succeeded in enlightening him as to the irreparable fault which he persisted in committing on returning to Lyons. It would, however, have sufficed for a moment of reflection, to a glance at the map to recognize the disadvantages of the movement on Lyons, the advantages of an undertaking on Mâcon and preferably on Tournus, where he could reach Lons-le-Saunier in three or four marches at most on to the right bank of the Saône. Thanks to the slowness and immobility of his opponents who had not realized his movement, he could still save everything on 7 March if, instead of crossing again at Bourg, he had decided to commit himself to the road to Mâcon, where he could have settled with the bulk of his army on the 8th of March.

7 March 1814. --First movements of Bianchi. --Bianchi, in fact, had no knowledge of the departure of Augereau from Lons-le-Saunier until the morning of 7 March. But completely ignorant of the direction taken by the Marshal, and not being able to discover whether the Duke of Castiglione had gone on Mâcon or on Bourg, he had not wanted to resume his movement before possessing positive information about his opponent's plans. Knowing that the Prince of Coburg was marching on Poligny, that the bulk of the Wimpffen Division was to come to Plainoiseau, he had ordered Generals Hardegg and Wimpffen to push their advance guards on Lons-le-Saunier and their scouts on the road to Saint-Amour. In front of his facing, he had sent a flying column for Saint-Trivier-de-Courtes under the command of Colonel Baron Hammerstein, and ordered General Scheither to occupy Mâcon immediately. At last, on his right, Lieutenant-Colonel Menninger, a messenger from St. Gengoux-le-Royal to Cluny, had several very active affairs with the armed peasants and the partisans of Damas.²¹

8 March 1814. --Augereau continues his march on Lyons. --The blindness or obstinacy of Augereau, arrived at Bourg on the evening of 7 March, prevented him from taking advantage of these favorable circumstances, the unexpected chances which were still open to him, the last opportunity to profit by a momentary numerical superiority, of chasing the feeble brigade of Scheither from Mâcon, and of compelling Bianchi to stop at Chalon. Although he had been informed of the presence of Austrian troops in Mâcon, he did not for a moment have the idea of checking the authenticity of this information, which he communicated to the prefect of the Rhône,²² he did not even think of to reconnoiter the strength of detachment that his adversary could have. Pressing his movement on Lyon by Meximieux. He contented himself with regulating the march of his column, of sending orders to Generals Bardet and Pouchelon to come to Pont-d'Ain, to General Rémond to take a position with what he had available at the Faubourg de Vaise.²³

He was personally convinced that while he was moving from Bourg to the Saône, and would try to debouch at Mâcon by forcing the passage to Saint-Laurent-de-l'Ain, Bianchi would not fail to throw his light troops against Lyons, and would succeed perhaps, to capture that great city, guarded almost exclusively by National Guards, and whose inhabitants seemed reluctant to defend themselves, fearing above all to lose his communications, to be cut off from his depots, and separated from his reinforcements coming from the army of Catalonia, Augereau decided at Bourg to make the great detour on Lyons, and abandoned to his adversary the advantage of being able, at his pleasure, to throw troops on the two banks of the Saône.²⁴

²¹STÄRKE, Eintheilung und Tagesbegebenheiten der Haupt-Armee im Monate März. (*K. K. Kriegs Archiv.*, II, 1.)

²²"The enemy," Augereau wrote to the prefect of Lyons, from Saint-Amour, on 7 March, "was, it seems, on the evening of the 6th at Mâcon. I intend to attack it; but it might be that he was already marching upon Lyons. It must be known in a positive way and if he sleeps tonight in Villefranche. In case the enemy should march through Villefranche, I shall go by Meximieux to defend Lyon." (*Archives of the War.*)

It is essential to remark that the information was false, that Scheither only entered Mâcon on the evening of the 7th; That Augereau, instead of addressing himself to the Prefect, should have scouted and inquired by his cavalry.

²³Augereau to the prefect of the Rhône, to the generals Bardet and Pouchelon, and order of march for the 8th of March. Saint-Amour, 7 March. (*Archives of the War.*) --DU CASSE. *Historical account of the operations of the Army of the Rhône.*

²⁴ Augereau to the prefect of the Rhône, to the generals Bardet and Pouchelon, and order of march for the 8th of March. Saint-Amour, 7 March. (*Archives of the War.*) --DU CASSE. *Historical account of the operations of the Army of the Rhône.*

Bianchi informed about the march of Augereau. --Affair of Crèches. --Scheithar thrown back on Mâcon.

--Meanwhile Bianchi had succeeded in obtaining positive information on the march of the Duke of Castiglione, and had ordered Scheithar to move his advanced guard from Mâcon to Saint-Symphorien-d'Ancelles. But the detachments pushed by this general and sent in reconnoiter from Mâcon to La Maison Blanche, had allowed themselves to be surprised at Crèches, and had been thrown back in disorder on Mâcon. The least serious demonstration undertaken by the French could compromise the brigade all the more seriously since it was absolutely in the air, and that it had only one regiment of infantry for support, which Bianchi sent with a battery to Tournus, and the cavalry brigade of General-Major Kuttalek, which had just been sent from Chalon-sur-Saône to Sennecey-le-Grand.²⁵

Movement of the Austrian columns of Bianchi. --Operations of Bubna. --On the left bank of the Saône Wimpffen, and the Major General Prince of Coburg, who had just rejoined him, had entered Lons-le-Saunier, had pushed their vanguards to Cousance, and detached a column, a battalion and two squadrons strong, which was to head towards Geneva and re-establish communications with Bubna. This general officer had taken advantage of the calm which had reigned since the departure of General Bardet and the immobility of the French on the right bank of the Arve to have Bonneville occupied by Major von Blankenstein and secure possession of the valley of the Arve in order to confine the cavalry of his division to Bernex, and charged Field-Marshal Lieutenant Klebelsberg to scout the Jura and pacify the country of Gex.²⁶

9 March 1814. --Augereau at Lyons. --March of Bianchi on Mâcon. --The 9th of March, while General Bardet arrived at Bourg, and General Pouchelon was settling at Neuville-sur-Ain and Pont-d'Ain, the bulk of the army of Augereau crossed Lyons, debouched on the right bank of the Saône, and entered on the road to Mâcon, preceded by the battalions of the National Guard of General Rémond, who occupied Villefranche.²⁷ Bianchi left Chalon at the same time and marched on Mâcon in two columns: one, composed of the bulk of his forces, proceeded straight from Chalon on Tournus through the valley of the Saône, covered on its right by the second column formed by the division of Wied-Runkel. Charged with dispersing the armed gatherings of the Charolais, the Prince of Wied, was ordered to march by Givry to Saint-Gengoux-le-Royal. One of his brigades (the Jakardovsky Brigade), passing through Montcenis, Blanzay, Saint-Romain-sous-Gourdon,²⁸ Le Rousset and Saint-Bonnet-de-Joux, was to occupy Charolles while the Prince with the brigade of Salins arrived on his side at Cluny.²⁹ The cuirassier brigade General Kuttalek advanced from Sennecey-le-Grand to Saint-Alboin, in order to be in a better position to support or collect Scheithar. The latter, resuming the movement which had failed the previous day, pushed as far as La Maison Blanche, south of Saint-Symphorien-d'Ancelles, and dispersed on his route the armed peasants who had surprised and mistreated his parties at Crèches.³⁰

²⁵STÄRKE, Eintheilung und Tagesbegebenheiten der Haupt-Armee im Monate März. (*K. K. Kriegs Archiv.*, III, 1.) --DU CASSE. *Historical account of the operations of the Army of the Rhône.*

²⁶Prince Schwarzenberg, daily report to the Emperor of Austria, Pont-sur-Seine, 15 March. (*K. K. Kriegs, Archiv.*, III, 272.)

²⁷Augereau to the Minister of War, to generals Bardet, Pouchelon and Rémond, Lyon, 9 March. (*Archives of the War.*)

²⁸STÄRKE, Eintheilung und Tagesbegebenheiten der Haupt-Armee im Monate März. (*K. K. Kriegs, Archiv.*, III, 1.)

The brigade detached on Charolles was to cut the canal of the Centre (which the Austrian document calls the canal of the Saône to the Loire), at the level of Saint Romain-sous-Gourdon.

²⁹STÄRKE, Eintheilung und Tagesbegebenheiten der Haupt-Armee im Monate März. (*K. K. Kriegs, Archiv.*, III, 1.)

³⁰Prince of Schwarzenberg, daily report to the Emperor of Austria, Troyes, 14 March. (*Ibid.*, III, 254.)

On the left bank of the Saône, Count Ignatius Hardegg, coming from Louhans, had drawn near the banks of that river, and arrived on the 9th at Cuisery, two leagues just east of Tournus. On his left the advanced guard of Wimpffen had pushed from Saint-Amour to Bourg, and had learned on the way that Augereau had reached Lyon by the road to Meximieux.³¹

Finally, the Crown Prince of Hesse-Homburg had pushed the bulk of the Austrian reserves as far as Seurre, and occupied Saint-Amour by the brigade of the Prince of Cobourg.

10 March 1814. --Movement of the troops of Augereau on the two banks of the Saône. --Inadequately informed of the strengths and plans of Bianchi, knowing only that the number of Austrian troops advancing on the right bank of the Saône was estimated at 15,000, having a vague knowledge of the entry into Mâcon of the front of the main column, informed of the march of another Austrian column on Bourg, Augereau resolved to stop Bianchi and to take away Mâcon, where he thought he could find only 1,500 to 2,000 men, by attacking³² that town by the two banks of the Saône.

Leaving at Lyons the division of Pannetier and two of his three regiments of cavalry, he ordered Musnier to march with his division and the 12th Hussars on Villefranche, already occupied by General Rémond, to continue the next day on Mâcon, to reconnoiter the position and strength of the Austrians and attack them. This attack was to be supported by General Bardet, to whom the Marshal sent orders to march from Bourg to Saint-Lesmont-de-l'Ain. General Pouchelon³³ was to come from Pont-d'Ain to replace General Bardet at Bourg. At last the Marshal, instead of pushing all the troops he had at Lyons against an enemy whose strength was unknown to him, he kept for no reason in reserve, a day's march behind the Musnier Division, the Pannetier Division, that he would only bring the 11th to Villefranche.³⁴

Satisfied with having been able to prevent the Austrians at Lyons, the Marshal was so unaware of the gravity of the situation, that before he decided on the 11th to move the division of Pannetier and the cavalry of Digeon to Villefranche, he had begun by giving to Pannetier the order to hold an infantry regiment, a squadron, and two pieces ready to move either on the road to Bourg or on that of Mâcon to reinforce the troops of Bardet or Musnier in case they would be repulsed, and that a little later he contented himself with sending to Villefranche one of the infantry regiments of Pannetier, and that he did not leave Lyons with the Pannetier and Digeon divisions himself until the 11th of March at 11 o'clock in the evening.³⁵

Movement of the Austrian troops. --Affair of Bourg. --Skirmish of Fleury. --Meanwhile, the Austrian troops executed the following movements: Bianchi, with the bulk of the Ist Corps, entered Mâcon about noon; but the lack of food resulting from the national uprising obliged him to give his troops more extensive cantonments than prudence and reason advised him. On his right the Prince de Wied-Runkel had arrived at Cluny with the brigade of Salins. His other brigade stopped on the 10th in the afternoon at Saint-Romain-sous-Gourdon, and was preparing to continue its march on Charolles the next day. Before his fore front, Scheither, who had retaken his position at La

³¹STÄRKE, Eintheilung und Tagesbegebenheiten der Haupt-Armee im Monate März. (*Ibid.*, III, 1.)

³²Augereau to Musnier and Bardet, Lyon, 9 March. (Correspondence of Augereau, *Archives of the War.*)

³³General Marchand, writing on March 10th from Carouge to Augereau, said to him: "The departure of the troops of Generals Bardet and Pouchelon has compromised my position. I am afraid of being obliged to retreat on the department of Mont Blanc." (*Archives of the War.*)

³⁴Augereau to Generals Musnier, Bardet and Pouchelon. Orders of movement for the 11th, Lyons, 10 March. (Correspondence of Augereau, *Archives of the War.*)

³⁵Orders to Generals Pannetier and Digeon and orders of movement, Lyon, 11 March. (Correspondence of Augereau, *Archives of the War.*)

Maison Blanche, sent word to the commander of the Austrian Ist Corps that he had nothing new to report to him, and that the most complete tranquility continued to reign on the line of the French outposts on the Villefranche side.³⁶

On the left bank of the Saône, the Crown Prince of Hesse Hombourg had advanced as far as Mervans with the Austrian reserves, and Lieutenant Field-Marshal Wimpffen had pushed as far as Saint-Amour. Colonel Simony had momentarily occupied Bourg with the hussars of Hesse-Hombourg; but, attacked by the advance guard of General Bardet, he had lost about fifty men, and had been vigorously pursued by the French towards Saint-Etienne-au-Bois, who stopped on the left bank of the Sevron.

Finally, Count Ignatius Hardegg, who had proposed to reach Bourg, had found the French troops of Bardet in position at the level of Fleyriat. In conformity with the orders of the Generalissimo, who had formally recommended that every partial engagement should be avoided whenever the enemy had the superiority of the number, the Lieutenant Field-Marshal immediately broke off the battle and brought his division to Montrevel.³⁷

11 March 1814. --Combat of Mâcon. --On the 11th of March, the Musnier Division, preceded by the 12th Hussars, debouching from Villefranche, surprised at Saint Georges-de-Reneins, about 3 kilometers south of Belleville-sur-Saône, the outposts of Scheither which having nothing to fear, had been neglected to be guarded, pushing them briskly on La Maison Blanche, overwhelmed the reserve posted on this point, and threw it in disorder on the bulk of the brigade which Scheither had made mount their horses and reunite to the north at the level of Saint-Symphorien-d'Annelles. Without leaving the Austrian squadrons time to deploy, and to recognize the weakness of his vanguard, Colbert cut down Scheither's cavalry, who, being wounded and dismounted in the combat, was obliged to flee on foot, taking from him two cannons and throwing the Austrian advanced guard on the road to Mâcon.

From the very beginning of the affair Bianchi had ordered the two divisions to take up arms and to occupy a position extending from the Saône at Saint-Clément-lès-Mâcon up to Charnay, to the south of the city. He had, at the same time, sent orders to the Prince of Wied to return as soon as possible with the Salins Brigade from Cluny sur Mâcon, which he had to keep at any cost, and made leave for Saint-Symphorien-d'Annelles General Haugwitz with two battalions charged with collecting Scheither and stopping the movement of the French. The arrival of this reinforcement enabled Scheither to rally his squadrons, and to throw himself with the Vincent Light Horse and the Hussars of Westphalia upon the hussars of Colbert. The latter, exhausted by the struggle which they had been alone in supporting, and by the vivacity of such a protracted pursuit, were on the point of folding, when the entry of two companies of light infantry compelled Scheither to continue his flight and to retire at 11 o'clock on Varennes. The battalions of Haugwitz, which had taken up a position on this point,³⁸ succeeded in maintaining their position until two o'clock in the afternoon against the efforts of the cavalry of Colbert and the infantry vanguard of Musnier.

In the meantime, Bianchi had had time to make his troops take a stand. General Fürstenwerther, with his brigade of grenadiers, had established himself on the heights of Saint-Clément-lès-Mâcon; 16 canons placed in battery on his fore front were to stop the movement of the French troops which would have tried to go on Mâcon passing between the village of Saint-Clément and the Saône. Another battery of 4 pieces and the Simbschen Regiment guarded the outskirts of the village and connected to the side of Carteronnes with the Quallenberg and Hirsch Brigades. On the right wing of Bianchi, Charnay, where the brigade of Salins was awaiting, was occupied by an infantry battalion and

³⁶STÄRKE. Eintheilung und Tagesbegebenheiten der Haupt-Armee im Monate März. (*K. K. Kriegs Archiv.*, III, 1.)

³⁷STÄRKE, Eintheilung und Tagesbegebenheiten der Haupt-Armee im Monate März. (*K. K. Kriegs Archiv.*, III, 1.)

³⁸One finds in *The History of the Austrian Dragoon Regiment n° 4* (Grand Duke of Tuscany), published by the *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, 1838, I, 312, interesting details on this first part of the battle of Mâcon: "The advance -guard of Major-General Scheither, surprised at La Maison Blanche, was obliged to fall back by Varennes on Charnay while the bulk of the French troops, pushing by the high road from Lyon to Mâcon, threatened the villages of Vinzelles and Saint-Léger. Captain Ast, at that moment, covered with equal skill and valor the right flank of General Scheither, which was particularly threatened during the retreat, and succeeded in saving three companies from the regiment of the military frontier of Brodi, which, posted on the extreme right and strongly pushed by the enemy, were about to be cut off and taken."

two squadrons of dragoons with three guns. In order to thwart a turning movement directed against that right wing, Bianchi had thrown into Vinzelles an infantry battalion and an artillery section. The cuirassiers of General Kuttalek, which the configuration of the ground would not have permitted to be used on the battlefield, were in reserve north of Mâcon, and a battalion, supporting a section of artillery (2 pieces), guarded in the city itself the stone bridge of the Saône.

At two o'clock in the afternoon, Musnier at length succeeded in chasing Scheither and Haugwitz from Varennes and throwing them back on Saint-Clément. The fierce resistance which he had just met at Varennes, the positive and agreeing information which had been given him by the inhabitants of the country side and the prisoners, ought to have demonstrated to Musnier that he was going to have to deal not with an advance-guard or to an isolated detachment, but to a body of a force superior to that of his division.

He should therefore have been satisfied with the results obtained, should have stopped his troops on the position of Varennes and Chaintré, establish himself there firmly, and awaited the arrival of the remainder of the troops of the Marshal to attempt with some chance of success the attack on Mâcon. Another consideration ought, moreover, to have persuaded him to leave it at that. The diversion, which General Bardet was to execute on the left bank of the Saône, had not occurred, and there was every reason to think, owing to the already advanced hour, that some circumstance had prevented this General from throwing himself from Bourg on Saint-Laurent-de-l'Ain.

Blinded by the rapid progress of his cavalry, forgetting that he was absolutely in the air and that his nearest support was a long day's march behind, General Musnier, immediately after the capture of Varennes, deployed his division and further compromised his already very adventurous situation by marching against Mâcon in two columns. While Bianchi was bringing back from that city the well-trying troops of Scheither and what remained of the two battalions of General Haugwitz, Musnier was moving from the vicinity of Varennes against Saint-Clément, leaving the high road to his artillery and the hussars flanked on their right by the two regiments of the brigade of Estève (20th and 67th), and at the same time ordering General Ordonneau to out flank the Austrian right, by moving from the heights of Chaintré to Vinzelles, Saint-Léger, and Charnay.

Although decimated by the artillery fire of Bianchi, the two regiments of General Estève continued their movement on Saint-Clément, attacked the regiment of Simbschen, and succeeded in seizing the heights and the village of Saint-Clément. But it was in vain that they attempted twice to debouch themselves, to assault the positions occupied behind this village by the grenadiers of Fürstenwerther, and crowned by a formidable artillery.

Musnier, obliged to content himself with the possession of Saint-Clément, still hoped that the flanking movement of the column of General Ordonneau would persuade his adversary to abandon to him Mâcon. The four battalions of General Ordonneau had at the same time taken Vinzelles from the Austrian infantry and pushed after them, first on Saint-Léger and then on Charnay.

Reassured about the fate of his left, seeing that if the French had renounced their attacks on this side, the column of Ordonneau was about to remove Charnay and threatened the battery established to the west of this village, Bianchi resolved to finish it. Taking advantage of a moment of hesitation and a certain flutter in the ranks of the troops of Ordonneau, he resolutely pushed forward the Hirsch and Quallenberg Brigades and launched against the French battalions what he had of cavalry on the right wing. The charge executed at this time by Major Ehrenstein, at the head of two squadrons of Würzburg Hussars and a squadron of velites of the Emperor Hussar Regiment,³⁹ decided

³⁹*The History of the Austrian Dragoon Regiment n° 4* (in 1814 dragoons of Würzburg), to which we have already cited, contains some interesting details on the decisive charge of the Austrian cavalry:

"The enemy, advancing at this moment by the road from Saint-Léger to Charnay, threatened to take the rear of Saint-Clément and fall at the same time on the right flank of Field-Marshal Bianchi. It even occupied Charnay, attacking the heights on the right of this village, on which the Field-Marshal Lieutenant had established a battery... At that moment the squadron of Captain Ast charged on the route of Charnay with so much determination and spirit that he obliged the enemy to retire to Loché. At the same moment two other squadrons of the regiment charged the enemy's column, which came out of Saint-Léger, and then one of the squadrons of dragoons, supported by a squadron of Emperor Hussars, rushed upon the enemy battalions that had begun to flank the Austrian right wing,

the fate of the day. Broken up by the Austrian squadrons, the battalions of Ordonneau retreated in all haste to Loché, where they tried to regain their footing. But at the same moment the Austrian infantry advanced on the whole line, and compelled General Musnier, who imprudently engaged all his troops without reserve, to abandon successively all the positions which he had conquered.

Pursued by the Austrian cavalry up to the height of La Maison Blanche, General Musnier brought back to Saint-Georges-de-Reneins his division for which the battle of Mâcon had cost 600 to 700 men and two dismantled pieces which had been left behind in Saint-Clément. The losses of the Austrian Ist Corps amounted to a thousand men.⁴⁰

On the evening of the 11th, Bianchi's troops, which had taken part in the battle, encamped in front of Mâcon, with the exception of the brigade of Scheither, which reoccupied La Maison Blanche and Saint-Symphorien-d'Annelles.

Thanks to the imprudent temerity of Musnier, but above all to the deplorable dispositions of Augereau, a day which had fortunately begun ended in a failure of real gravity. It is, indeed, incontestable that if he had been responsible for giving formal and precise orders to Musnier, if he had not attempted to have two divisions coming from opposite directions, separated by considerable distances, and by a river as large as the Saône, and consequently unable to communicate with one another, simultaneously to arrive on the field of battle, to spare his army the defeat which it had just sustained. Finally, if instead of keeping the division of the Pannetier and the cavalry of Digeon at Lyons, Augereau had with all his strength united against the positions of Bianchi, he would have been the more likely to attain his object, to arrest the Austrians in advance on Lyons, that the Austrian general had for his part made the fault of weakening by detaching on his right the Wied-Runkel Division,⁴¹ that his light troops were surprised by the offensive of the French and that the various columns of the Army of the South were still far from being united.

and overwhelm them while the other squadron succeeded in forcing 200 enemy infantrymen who had shut themselves up in a farm to put down their arms. (*Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, 1838, I, 312-316.)

⁴⁰STÄRKE, Eintheilung und Tagesbegebenheiten der Haupt-Armee im Monate März. (*K. K. Kriegs Archiv.*, II, 1.) - *-Armee Nachrichten*, n^o 9, Troyes, 13 March (*Ibid.*, III, 246), and Prince of Schwarzburg, daily report to the Emperor of Austria, 14 March (*Ibid.*, III, 254); Augereau to the Minister of War, Villefranche, 12 March (Correspondence of Augereau, *Archives of the War*).

⁴¹Augereau understood his situation so little, he was so uninformed, or he kept so much information in his hands, that in the course of the day of the 11th of March he wrote to General Musnier to congratulate him on the advantages gained against Scheither, he said: "If you do not think you can live in Villefranche, choose a good position and wait for the arrival of the troops that will leave this evening if the infantry regiment and the 50 hussars that left this morning are not enough for you." (Augereau to General Musnier, Lyon, 11 March. --Correspondence of Augereau; *Archives of the War*).

There are, moreover, some curious glimpses of the conduct of Marshal Augereau and of General Musnier in an anonymous denunciation dated from Lyons, 16 March, and which must have been written by a secret agent of Clarke. We hesitate less to reproduce this piece as it was taken into consideration by the Minister and gave rise to the report that will be read a little further:

"I'm not a soldier. It may not be well for me to speak of war, but the critical and imperious circumstances in which France finds herself can excuse a citizen who says what he sees and judges with his eyes. The Marshal, Duke of Castiglione, organized an army. He left Lyons with 20,000 men, of whom 10,000 were from the Army of Catalonia, who are the bravest and the most magnificent soldiers to be seen. His Excellency carried his headquarters to Lons-le-Saunier, directing 6,000 men to Geneva, to reinforce General Marchand, when he learned that the enemy who had evacuated Mâcon and even Chalon had been prodigiously strengthened in this direction the last town, and could, on descending the Saône, made a helping hand to Lyon. At once the Marshal made a hasty retreat. The enemy, arrived at Mâcon before him, made a bridge head of bridge on the side of Bourg and mined the bridge. The Marshal, not desirous of or unable to attempt to take Mâcon, returned to Lyons with 9,000 men, after having left 6,000 at Meximieux. Immediately he sent to Villefranche to a division commanded by General Musnier, in which were two regiments from Catalonia. On the 11th of March this division advanced to the suburbs of Mâcon, when it came upon a masked battery, which caused it much trouble, and compelled it to fall back, however, by bringing back two guns

The presence of the division of Ignatius Hardegg, which could easily throw itself on the right flank of his column or cut off his retreat from Montrevel, had probably prevented General Bardet from undertaking the movement projected on Saint-Laurent de l'Ain. The news of the arrival of the troops of Lieutenant Field-Marshal Wimpffen and the Prince of Coburg at Coligny, a short march from Bourg, had, moreover, contributed to the decision of Bardet to remain on this point, the possession of which seemed to him important.

and 500 of the 1100 men whom it had taken in the morning. At 11 o'clock in the evening, the Marshal sent away everything that remained available at Lyons, and at its head took the road to Villefranche. On 12, 13 and 14 March, he did not attack. We do not know what happened yesterday."

"The enemy, while holding the bridge of Mâcon, has an advantageous position, for it divides our army, and may retire to that bank of the Saône, which it deems favorable, while we must return to Lyons to report in an emergency to the most threatened side. It would therefore be a fault committed by the Marshal not to have, in the first attack of Mâcon, guarded the bridge, or had it blown up. He would have avoided forced marches to his army, and would have carried the whole of his forces to a single point. This fault did not escape the military; they speak highly of it, and the disfavor they have for Marshal Augereau is such as to paralyze their courage."

Marshal Augereau, a valiant warrior, is not the right man. Would it then be impossible to bring Marshal Suchet or Marshal Ney? In any case, Major-General Musnier is an inept and dangerous man, since on the field of battle he stammered giving his orders. It was he who, when the enemy was at the gates of Lyons before the organization of the army, being at the Hotel de Ville, and hearing women cry, "*Here is the enemy!*" ran out from those he attended, and left his hat and his sword. The Army of Lyons imperiously needs to be better commanded ..."

"This report is faithful. I do not regard it as a denunciation. I am incapable of doing so, but as a secret warning to inform the government. Undoubtedly, you may not add whole faith to it; but, Monseigneur, deign to write to the colonels of the 1st, 7th, 20th, and 67th of the line, 4th and 12th Hussars from Catalonia. They will instruct you thoroughly ... " (*Archives of the War.*)

Completed by some insignificant details of subsequent events, this anonymous denunciation did not leave Lyons until the 19th. Despite the difficulties which the transmission of news had presented at that moment, it arrived fairly quickly in Paris, since on 24 March Dupont de Vieuxseux gave the Duke of Feltre the following characteristic note:

"The *confidential letter* written from Lyons, under the date of the 19th instant, agrees with other opinions reached here by several persons. There is only one cry in the army and in Lyons about the incapacity of the commander, and everyone is convinced beforehand of the misfortunes which will infallibly result from the manner in which the operations are directed in this part of France."

"If His Excellency deems it improper to send to His Majesty the aforesaid letter which he has received from Lyons, it would be easy to make a report to His Majesty to inform him of what is going on and properly judge what effective measures need to be taken in this regard."

On the same day Clarke took a resolution contained in the note attached to the report of Dupont de Vieuxseux: "Report to His Majesty. Send Colonel Balthazar to the Army of Lyons to stay there. The Marshal will have to receive instructions from which he cannot deviate."

We shall have occasion to return to this subject a little farther and to refer to the report which the Minister had asked for the establishment and which he transmitted to the Emperor on 26 March after having somewhat softened the terms and form of the redaction of Dupont de Vieuxseux.

The Austrian reserves, led by the crown prince of Hesse-Hombourg, had come during the march of Mervans to Louhans.

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