

*From Steuben to Scott: The Adoption of French Infantry Tactics by
the United States Army, 1807-1816*

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Introduction

I wrote the following article nearly thirty years ago. At the time I was interested in the doctrinal foundation of the United States Army during the War of 1812, an interest that resulted in a number of studies on American wartime tactics, manuals and training, including that which follows. "From Steuben to Scott" was presented at the 1988 conference of the International Commission on Military History, which was held in Helsinki in 1988 and three years later it was published in the *Acta* of the conference. This was a rather obscure publication and over the years I have had many requests for either copies of the article or advice on how to obtain a copy.

This being the case I have decided to publish a slightly revised version in the *War of 1812 Magazine* so that it will reach a broader audience and hopefully lead to a lessening of the requests for copies of the article.

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The adoption by the United States Army of the French infantry *Réglement* of 1791 was a process that occurred over a considerable period of time. The *Réglement* was not adopted wholesale, it was gradually brought into service, at first through the medium of short abridgements by individual authors and, later, by the work of a board of officers under orders to only modify an existing translation of the original to make it conform to American practice. This process took place over a period of nine years -- from 1807 to 1816 -- and was marked with a confusion that had an adverse effect on the American army's performance during war of 1812-1815 fought with Great Britain. Confusing and dangerous as this process may have been, it created a precedent in American service, both for the use of French manuals and for the use of boards of officers to adopt manuals.

The tactical system of the Continental Army of the Revolutionary War was based on a small manual compiled by Frederick William von Steuben*, a German officer in American service. Steuben's *Blue Book*, as it was commonly called, consisted of two parts. The first was a system of infantry tactics encompassing the manual of arms and exercises up to the battalion level but with little space devoted to the manoeuvre of higher formations such as brigades.¹ The second part of the *Blue Book* was concerned with military routine and contained information on camps, marches, inspections, guard mounting and the duties of every rank from private to colonel. When compiling this manual, Steuben took most of the tactical section from the British *1764 infantry regulations as he was aware of American prejudice in favour of that work, which had been widely published in the colonies prior to the revolution.² He also drew material from French, Prussian and American sources.³ In essence, Steuben's little tract was a concise and basic manual of infantry tactics and military administration ideally suited to the needs of a young and small army.

From 1778 to 1812, the Blue Book remained the manual of the army and largely satisfied that service's limited requirements. By the first decade of the 19th century, however, there was a growing awareness in American military circles that the *Blue Book* was antiquated and needed replacement by a more modern source. This feeling was given impetus by the threat of war with Great Britain caused by the Chesapeake Crisis of 1807. A small coterie of writers on military topics began to agitate in print for the adoption of a new tactical system based on recent European experience.

The first of these commentators was Maximillian Godefroy who, in 1807, published *Military Reflections, on Four Modes of Defense, for the United States* in which he examined and rejected the current foundations of the American military establishment, the militia system and Steuben's tactics.⁴ Godefroy urged the United States to replace the militia with a force of regulars trained in a modern tactical system who would be able to meet a European enemy on an equal basis. Godefroy's arguments were echoed by those of an expatriate French officer, Irénée Amelot De La Croix, whose 1808 *Military and Political Hints addressed to Congress* prevailed upon the United States to discard its "inadequate system of tactics" and to "preserve the blood of your soldiers, adopt the modern French tactick [sic] which alone will give the United States the full force of American Valour and enable their citizens to crown with laurels their native intrepidity."⁵ The third and most important of these commentators was William Duane editor of the Philadelphia *Aurora*. A personal friend of President Thomas Jefferson and on familiar terms with Secretary of War Henry Dearborn

and the senior officer of the army, Brigadier General James Wilkinson, Duane was in an influential position concerning military matters about which he took a great interest. Duane debated Godefroy's criticisms of the American military in the pages of the *Aurora* and, while he agreed that Steuben's aging manual should be superseded by a more modern tactical system, Duane defended the militia organization that he felt should be retained but reformed.⁶

The tactical system that all three commentators favoured was that established for the French Army in 1791.⁷ The 1791 *Réglement concernant l'exercice et les manœuvres de l'infanterie* was the outcome of an intense debate in the French army about the most effective formation in battle -- the column or the line. This debate between proponents of the column or *l'ordre profond* and those of the line or *l'ordre mince* dated almost to the beginning of the 18th century but was given fresh fuel by the humiliating defeats suffered by the French army during the Seven Years' War, defeats that resulted in a major reform of that service and its tactics.⁸ After a series of different manuals had been successively introduced and then replaced, a new system was put into service in 1792. This *Réglement*, the outcome of the tactical debate between the adherents of the column or the line, was a manual that avoided prescribing immutable rules for the battlefield but, instead, Early December, stressed tactical flexibility. The *Réglement* favoured neither the column nor the line; both formations were presented, the choice was left to the officer on the spot. This was in marked contrast to the manuals of other armies that, based on the more rigid concepts of Frederician warfare, left little initiative and many rules to commanders. The 1791 *Réglement's* flexibility allowed French commanders to develop a system of tactical warfare that could be altered as required, a change from the confining strictures of the tactics practiced by most European armies. Without intending it, perhaps, the 1791 *Réglement* changed the nature of infantry warfare. Its effect was best summed up by a knowledgeable commentator, Scharnhorst*, who stated that the French "had developed a practical system of tactics that permitted them to fight over open or broken ground in open or close order, but this without their being aware of their system."⁹

The impressive series of victories gained by the French revolutionary and imperial armies in the 1790s and early 1800s convinced American observers that the French tactical system was the key to success in modern warfare. With Secretary of War Dearborn's encouragement, William Duane began to publish a series of pamphlets that were collected and into two volumes in 1809 as the *American Military Library*.¹⁰ The *Library* was basically a small encyclopedia of warfare in the Napoleonic period and contained material on military history, the evolution of tactics, staff duties,

fortification and separate studies on infantry, light infantry, rifle, cavalry and artillery tactics all based on established European texts. It is an important title for three reasons: it introduced the theories of Jomini to American readers; it contained the first American text on the duties of military staffs; and it provided the first American translation of the 1791 *Réglement*.¹¹ Duane's translation of the *Réglement* was apparently actively supported by the War Department and it seems clear that Secretary of War Dearborn intended to introduce the French system into the regular army.¹² In 1808, Dearborn had plates engraved at government expense of the manual of arms, plates that were exact copies of those that illustrated the *Réglement* and depicted figures wearing French uniforms.¹³ Whatever Dearborn's intentions, the adoption of a new system of tactics was suspended when the administration of James Madison came into office in March 1809, and Dearborn was replaced by William Eustis.

Eustis at first showed little interest in the subject of infantry tactics but increasing tension with Great Britain caused him to examine the state of American military preparedness. As a result of the Chesapeake Crisis, the army had undergone a major increase in strength. Five new infantry regiments were added to the three existing units, and a new artillery and cavalry regiment also joined the establishment. Much of this additional force was deployed in the newly-acquired Louisiana Territory. In 1810, this force, the major field formation in the army, was moved to Cantonment Washington in the Mississippi Territory where a "school of discipline" was created to train it.¹⁴ Confusion prevailed over which manual should be used to drill the troops. Most regimental officers favoured the 1791 *Réglement* which was available in either Duane's translation or that of De La Croix published in Boston in 1810 while others preferred Steuben's *Blue Book* or even the current British manual.¹⁵ To overcome this confusion, one senior officer, Colonel Alexander Smyth, prepared an abridgement of the *Réglement* and Eustis ordered him to test it with the troops in Cantonment Washington.¹⁶ The trial was a success and in December 1810 Eustis decided that Steuben should be replaced by "the system of organization and tactics of the French Armies."¹⁷ He authorized Smyth to prepare his treatise for publication and, on 30 March 1812, Alexander Smyth's *Regulations for the Field Exercises, Manoeuvres and Conduct of the Infantry* was adopted, by presidential order, "for the government of the infantry of the United States."¹⁸

Smyth's *Regulations* consisted of two parts; the first was a functional shortening of the 1791 *Réglement* proper and the second was an administrative section taken directly from those portions of Steuben's *Blue Book* not concerned with drill.¹⁹ Smyth's work was a functional abridgement of

the major elements of the French system that also retained much that was useful in Steuben's earlier work.

The adoption of new system of tactics was timely for, as Madison's government resolved on war to settle its disputes with Britain, the regular U. S. Army was again increased in the spring of 1812 to a total of 25 infantry regiments. With the declaration of war in June, 1812, the recruiting and training of these new units became an urgent priority but the primitive military administrative structure of the United States was soon overburdened -- it was one thing to raise an army on paper but an entirely different thing to put it in the field. Most of infantry regiments authorized in 1812 were sent to the northern theatre of war, which was the frontier with Canada, and they lacked weapons, uniforms and, above all, training.²⁰ It was ironic that those units of the prewar army that had reached an advanced state of preparedness remained in their peacetime garrisons in Louisiana and the western territories while the army that was to actively campaign against Britain consisted largely of raw recruits led by hastily-commissioned officers.

Some feeble attempts were made to prepare the new infantry regiments for the field. A provisional camp of instruction was established at Philadelphia in the summer of 1812 but was abandoned in the autumn when Major General Henry Dearborn, the senior officer of the army, was ordered to send all recruits "not otherwise disposed of" to Albany or some station on Lake Champlain to be organized for the invasion of Canada.²¹ New training camps were created at Greenbush near Albany, Plattsburgh, Buffalo and Lewiston late in 1812 but the quality of instruction was poor and the string of defeats suffered by American soldiers in the first year of the war showed them to be no match for their British adversaries. In early 1813, Major General Morgan Lewis commented on the poor state of the army's training that he felt "has been too long delayed and the troops are still as ignorant as when they first enlisted. We want able inspectors ... Our officers require as much instruction as the men."²²

Instruction continued throughout the winter of 1812-1813 and matters improved somewhat in the new year as commanding generals tried hard to prepare their troops to fight against a tough opponent. By April, soldiers were being drilled six hours a day at Greenbush and Ft. Niagara where an officer remarked dryly that "We drill every Day and are making such progress that we shall Die with some grace next summer."²³ Further west at Fort Meigs in the * Territory, Major General William Henry Harrison commanded a mixed force of regulars and militia. Harrison ordered his regulars to drill daily and the militia were to exercise "each day at least four hours by companies in

the manual exercise in time facing Wheeling &c." 24 One of the most rigorous training camps for the northern army was that conducted by Major General Wade Hampton, commanding at Burlington, Vermont, in the summer of 1813. Hampton ordered his officers to drill their NCOs separately before instructing their entire companies.²⁵ Not satisfied with their efforts, Hampton then instituted officers's drill squads from which no officer was excused without Hampton's written permission.²⁶ By the end of July 1813, these squads were dispensed with as instruction had reached the regimental level and, soon after, Hampton could exercise his entire division together as a complete formation.²⁷ Throughout the campaign season during the summer, the army continued to train whenever it could. When Major General James Wilkinson arrived in August to take command of Military District No. 9, which included most of the frontier with Canada, he ordered a redoubling of all training in his command.²⁸

Despite all the energy devoted to training, however, the army in the northern theatre had a very mixed record in battle. The United States won significant victories at the battles of York, Sackets Harbor, Ft. George and the Thames but suffered humiliating defeats at Beaver Dams, Chateaugay and Crysler's Farm. These defeats were partially caused by poor strategic direction and weak leadership on the part of senior officers who were not the equal of their British counterparts -- but they were also caused by the fact that army had still not reached a high enough level of competence in the field to ensure victory. Most of the training conducted in 1812 and 1813 seems to have been the basic type up to the regimental level. Regimental and company officers were now either learning their business or were being replaced but, with the exception of Hampton's division, very few regular regiments could manoeuvre together in a brigade formation.

The ability of the army to perform properly in the field was also weakened by the introduction of a new drill manual in the spring of 1813. This new manual, the *Hand Book for Infantry*, was the work of William Duane and its adoption by the government came about largely as the result of political not military considerations.

Duane had been highly critical of Smyth's *Regulations* which he characterized as "no more than a very injurious mutilation of the French infantry system" compiled by an officer "incapable of exercising a company."²⁹ He had addressed a pamphlet to Congress that attacked Smyth's work and asserted that, by law, only Congress and not the executive could establish a system of discipline for the army.³⁰ At about the same time, Duane put to press what he described as a small booklet "calculated for the mere parade duties for infantry,"³¹ This publication came to the notice of

General John Armstrong, who had replaced Eustis as Secretary of War. When Armstrong was approached by Senator David R. Williams in February 1813, on the subject on infantry tactics, he assured Williams that Duane's handbook "furnished the best preliminary instruction in relation to the subject I have met with; and I have no scruple in recommending it to the adoption of Congress, for the use of the Army of the United States."³² Taking Armstrong's advice, Congress voted to authorize the President to select a temporary system of discipline and then, subsequently, put forward a permanent system.³³ On 19 March, 1813, one day after Armstrong had granted Duane a colonel's commission and appointed him an adjutant in the army, Duane's *Hand Book* was ordered to "be received and observed as the system of Infantry Discipline for the Army of the United States."³⁴

The *Hand Book for Infantry*, like Smyth's *Regulations*, was based on the French 1791 *Réglement* but was a radical abridgement, compressing the original from over 300 to less than 100 pages. Only two of the eight drill chapters of the *Hand Book* were devoted with the evolutions of formations larger than battalions and although Duane claimed that his work "applied equally to the movements of a squad of 20 or a battalion of 1 000 men," his *Hand Book* was an elementary primer suitable only for the militia and the basic training of recruits.³⁵ Its adoption brought a storm of protest from officers in the field who, familiar with Duane's little book, knew that it was unsuitable as a system of tactical instruction and tried to find ways to get around the order. Some concluded that the previous systems had not been superceded and continued to use Smyth or even Steuben.³⁶ One regimental commander, Colonel E. W. Ripley, trained his unit with the British manual, the 1792 *Regulations*, while a more creative approach was taken by an officer at Charleston who compiled his own manual from a variety of sources as best suited him.³⁷ When Armstrong toured the northern units in the autumn of 1813, commanding generals frankly told him that they were not using the *Hand Book* because "it was objectionable & that the order establishing it required re-consideration."³⁸ In January, 1814, taking heed of the complaints that he had received, Armstrong ordered the Adjutant General of the Army to query fourteen senior officers as to whether the *Hand Book* should be revised or replaced.³⁹ The addressees were almost unanimous in their condemnation of Duane's manual.⁴⁰ But the damage had been done .? as one period commentator remarked, the result of introducing a new and unsatisfactory manual "in the midst of an arduous war" was "to throw back the tactical instruction of the army."⁴¹

One of the most vociferous opponents of Duane's manual, a work that he felt had "done

much harm" was 27-year old Brigadier General Winfield Scott.⁴² A thorough professional and an ardent admirer of French military theory and practice, Scott had, shortly after being commissioned in the army in 1809, requested to be sent to Europe to collect materials from which he could compile treatises on tactics and discipline.⁴³ During the war, Scott had established an outstanding record as a regimental commander and staff officer. Promoted to brigadier general in 1814, Scott was ordered to the Left Division where he was given the task by his commanding officer, Major General Jacob Brown, of training the division to take the field. Having served along the northern frontier since the outbreak of war, Scott was quite familiar with the shortcomings of training in the army and he established a camp of instruction at Buffalo that provided the first sustained training at an advanced level for the regular army during the war. Utilizing a site that had been chosen as a training ground by Smyth in 1812, Scott assembled two brigades of regular infantry and attached artillery and cavalry in April, 1814, and began to rectify the errors that had adversely effected the army's performance in the preceding two years. He resolved the drill manual problem by adopting neither Smyth nor Duane but going back to their source, the 1791 *Réglement*, of which he had copies both of the French original and of an English translation published by De La Croix in Boston in 1810.⁴⁴ Using a system of tactics that he regarded as the best of its kind, Scott set about preparing the Left Division for battle.

Following Steuben and Hampton's example, he began by training the officers and, when this was accomplished, he set these officers to train their men, starting with basic instruction and progressing upwards to regimental manoeuvres. Drilling went for up to ten hours a day and, by June 1814, Scott was manoeuvring his command by brigades "to the great delight of the troops themselves, who now began to perceive why they had been made to fag so long at the drill of the soldier, the company, and the battalion. Confidence, the dawn of victory, inspired the whole line."⁴⁵ Intensive training, combined with strict discipline and an attention to camp sanitation that reduced sickness, produced the most combat-ready force the United States would field during the War of 1812. When Brown took his division into Canada in July 1814, the results of Scott's work were immediately apparent. In bloody fighting on open ground, the division achieved a major success against the British at Chippewa and a limited tactical victory at Lundy's Lane before successfully defending Ft. Erie against a lengthy siege. The quality of Brown's troops impressed their opponents and a British commentator noted that the American soldier "seems to have wonderfully improved in the last year" of the war and to have "shown all the discipline, as well as

spirit of enterprize, that could be wished for."⁴⁶

The high levels of competence and success achieved by the Left Division were not repeated by the other major force on the northern frontier, Major General George Izard's Right Division. Complaining that "Different systems of instruction have been adopted by the officers of this division," Izard reverted to the use of Steuben's *Blue Book* to train his men.⁴⁷ The return to Steuben's system meant that the two divisions could not manoeuvre together when they joined forces in the autumn of 1814. This problem was duly noted by Congress who demanded to know why the army did not have a standard tactical system and what was being done to correct this error.⁴⁸ In response, Secretary of War James Monroe, who had replaced Armstrong, assembled a board of officers to compile a system of infantry tactics that would be given presidential approval and made standard throughout the army.⁴⁹ This board, consisting of brevet Major General Winfield Scott and four other officers, was convened in late December, 1814. The members of the board were not given much leeway in their choice of subject matter; they were instructed not to compile a new system but to so modify the French 1791 *Réglement* as to make it "correspond with the organization of the Army of the U. S."⁵⁰ The board was directed to work from an English translation of the *Réglement* published by John Macdonald in London in 1803.⁵¹ Scott, who had used the *Réglement* to train the most successful American army of the war, had no doubts about the merits of the French system. In January, 1815, he informed Monroe that "The Board has no hesitation in unanimously declaring that it is the System which they would themselves have adopted, as they believe it is decidedly superior to any other extant."⁵²

The product of the board's labours was the *Rules and Regulations for the Field Exercise and Manoeuvres of Infantry*, commonly called the 1815 Regulations, ordered for the use of the regular infantry in 1816 after the war had ended.⁵³ The new manual was an almost exact duplicate of the Macdonald's English translation of the *Réglement* and was a bulky volume of 360 pages and 40 plates. The major modifications made by the board were changing the terminology used in the texts to correspond with American practice. Although he had supervised the preparation of the new manual, Scott felt that the board's work had been "hastily and imperfectly concluded" because, like the original *Réglement*, the 1815 Regulations did not include any drill for light infantry or rifle troops.⁵⁴ Scott had the opportunity to correct this omission in 1824 when he headed another board that revised the 1815 Regulations. The result was *Infantry Tactics; or, Rules for the Exercise and Manoeuvres of the Infantry of the U. S. Army*, which was ordered for service in January, 1825.⁵⁵

The 1825 manual incorporated brief sections on light infantry and rifle drill but was, otherwise, little changed from the 1815 Regulations.

The introduction of French infantry tactics into the United States Army was a confusing process that, because it took place in wartime, was also perilous. The confusion resulted from the government's reliance on the work of private individuals whose abridgements of the original *Réglement* were not based on actual combat experience. In the case of William Duane, the choice of his manual was heavily influenced by political considerations that had little to do with actual needs of the army. The danger resulted from introducing a new tactical system in wartime without ensuring that its use was enforced throughout the army and there is no doubt that this lack of enforcement had an adverse effect on the army's performance during the War of 1812. As difficult and dangerous as this process was, it did have some beneficial effects. With the exception of the 1834 manual which was a direct translation of the 1831 French *Ordonnance* by Scott, all future American infantry manuals adopted in peacetime were either studied or compiled by boards of officers appointed for their knowledge and, once introduced, the use of these manuals was enforced by regulation.⁵⁶

The choice of the 1791 French *Réglement* as the source of the new U. S. infantry tactics can be traced to the influence of commentators like Godefroy, De La Croix and, especially, William Duane, on the government. It was also a result of the prestige enjoyed by the revolutionary and imperial French armies which was at its height in 1807 when the decision was first made to make a change from Steuben's system. The use of a French source during this period was not restricted to the American infantry; the artillery and engineers were using military texts that were either translations or abridgements of French manuals.⁵⁷ Such was the influence of French military science on the United States that little consideration seems to have been given to the adoption of any other European system, notably the British *1792 Regulations*, although this work did see some unofficial use during the war. Once established, the French influence in U.S. military circles continued to grow after 1815, spread by the teaching of Dennis Hart Mahan at the Military Academy at West Point and by the posting of American officers to Europe to observe and report on the latest techniques in the French Army.⁵⁸

In the final analysis, perhaps the most important lesson that came out of the adoption of the French tactical system in 1807-1816 was not the choice of that system, the timing of its introduction, or its enforcement, it was the fact that soldiers must be fully trained before being

committed to action against a professional opponent. This was a lesson that had been learned by the Continental Army in the Revolutionary War but had been forgotten in peacetime with dire results in the first years of the War of 1812. Although the wartime American officers were concerned with the preparation of their troops for battle and did their best to implement proper schools of instruction, it was not until a portion of the army underwent rigorous and sustained training at an advanced level that the United States was able to take the field with a fair chance of success. Scott's use of the 1791 *Réglement* to train the American Left Division in the spring of 1814 was incidental to the quality of instruction he provided that division as the choice of a manual is only the first step in the proper preparation of troops for battle. This was the most important lesson that came out of the Americans experience with adopting new tactics during the War of 1812.

1

On Steuben, see Robert K. Wright Jr., *The Continental Army* (Washington, 1983). All references to Steuben's manual are taken from *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States* (Boston, 1794) reprinted as *Baron von Steuben's Revolutionary War Drill Manual* (Dover, 1985).

2

Wright, p. 141, quoting Steuben to Franklin, 28 September, 1779, in the Steuben Papers, New York Historical Society. The British 1764 *Regulations* are properly titled *The manual exercise, as ordered by His Majesty in 1764*. The first American edition was published in New York in 1766, at least seven other editions appeared in Boston and New York between 1766 and 1775.

3

Ernest W. Peterkin, *The Exercise of Arms in the Continental Infantry ...* (Bloomfield, 1989). According to the author who has made a detailed study of the sources of Steuben's manual, 78 % of the manual of arms in Steuben is taken from the British 1764 *Regulations*, 16 % from Timothy Pickering, *An Easy Plan of Discipline for a Militia* (Salem, 1775) and 4 % from William Windham, *A Plan of Discipline, for the Use of the Norfolk Militia* (London, 1759). Steuben's main European sources were the French *Exercice de l'Infanterie Francoise, Extrait de Ordonnance du Roy du 6, Mai 1755*, the *Ordonnance du Roi, Pour Regler L'Exercice de L' Infanterie, Du 1 er Janvier, 1766* and the Prussian regulations as translated by William Fawcett and published in London in 1754 as *Regulations for the Prussian Infantry*.

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Maximillian Godefroy, *Military Reflections, on Four Modes of Defense, for United States* (Baltimore, 1807) quoted in Theodore Crackel, "The Battle of Queenston Heights, 13 October 1812" in Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, *America's First Battles, 1776-1865* (University of Kansas, 1986), p. 37.

5

I.A. De Lacroix, *Military and Political Hints ...*, (Boston, 1808), p. 47.

6

Crackel, p. 359.

7

Properly *Réglement concernant l' exercice et les manoeuvres de l' infanterie. Du 1er Aout, 1791* (Paris, 1792 and many subsequent editions).

8

On the tactical debate within the 18th century French Army, see Jean Colin, *L' infanterie au XVIIIe Siecle, La Tactique* (Paris, 1907); John Lynn, *The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France* (Chicago, 1984) and Robert S. Quimby, *The Background of Napoleonic Warfare* (New York, 1957). Useful information will also be found in Peter Paret, *Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, 1807-1815* (Princeton, 1966).

9

Scharnhorst, "Introduction to Infantry Tactics" (1811) contained in Paret, *Yorck*, p. 258. The emphasis is in the original.

10

The American Military Library, or, Compendium of the Modern Tactics. Embracing the Discipline, Manoeuvres, and Duties of Every Species of Troops ... Adapted to the Use of the Militia of the United States, (2 vols., Philadelphia, 1809).

11

Properly *The System of Discipline and Manoeuvres of Infantry ... Established for the National Guards and Armies of France* (Philadelphia, 1807) which later became a supplement to Volume 1 of the *Military Library*.

12

Duane later claimed that he had the 1791 *Réglement* translated at the government's request, see *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, (7 vols., Washington, 1832-1867), Vol. 2, p. 89, Duane to the Secretary of War, 27 April, 1819.

13

U. S. National Archives, Record Group (RG) 107, Series 221, Reel 47, Mifflin to the Secretary of War, 4 June, 1812. These plates were later used for both Smyth's manual and the U. S. 1815 *Regulations*.

14

Crackel, p. 38.

15

"The New Infantry Tactics" by "Hindman," *Army and Navy Chronicle*, 15 October, 1835, pp. 332-333.

16

Theophilus Rodenbaugh and William Haskin, *The Army of the United States. Historical Sketches of Staff and Line* (New York, 1896), p. 25.

17

Eustis to President of the Senate, 13 December, 1810, quoted in J. C. A. Stagg, *Mr. Madison's War* (Princeton, 1983), p.143.

18

The general order of 30 March, 1812, is from the title page of Smyth's work which properly titled *Regulations for the Field Exercise, Manoeuvres, and Conduct of the Infantry of the United States Drawn Up and Adapted to the Organization of the Militia and Regular Troops* (Philadelphia, 1812). All descriptions of Smyth are taken from this edition.

19

ibid.

20

For a detailed account of the unpreparedness of the U. S. for war in 1812, see Stagg, *Mr. Madison's War*.

21

E. A. Cruikshank, editor, *Documentary History of the Campaigns on the Niagara Frontier in the Years, 1812, 1813 and 1814*, (9 vols., Welland, 1896-1908), vol. III, Eustis to Dearborn, 9 July, 1812.

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U. S. National Archives, RG 107, Series 221, Reel 54, Lewis to Secretary of War, 8 February, 1813.

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John C. Fredriksen, ed., "'A Poor But Honest Sodger": Colonel Cromwell Pearce, The 16th U. S. Infantry, and the War of 1812," *Pennsylvania History*, 52 (July, 1985), p. 135; Queen's University Archives, Kingston, Canada, Ft. Niagara Orderly Book, 10 December, 1812, 18 January, 1813; John N. Crombie, ed., "The Papers of Major Daniel McFarland. A Hawk of 1812." *The Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine*, 51, (1968), p. 105, McFarland to brother, 2 February, 1813.

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Harlow Lindley, ed., *Fort Meigs and the War of 1812*, (Columbus, 1975), p. 12, General Order, Fort Meigs, 22 April, 1813; p. 31, General Order, Ft. Meigs, 15 June, 1813.

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"Garrison Orders, Burlington, Vermont, July 13 " Aug. 4, 1813," *Moorsfield Antiquarian*, 1 (1937), p. 82, Regimental Orders, 11th and 29th Regiments, n.d..

26

Ibid., p. 86, General Order, Burlington, 23 July, 1813.

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Ibid., p. 96, General Order, Burlington, 31 July, 1813.

28

Cruikshank, *Documentary History*, Vol. VII, p. 144, General Order, Ft. George, 18 September, 1813.

29

William Duane, *A Bird's Eye Sketch of the Military Concerns of the United States, Respectfully Addressed to the Consideration of Congress* quoted in Crackel, pp. 39-40; "Letters of William Duane," *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, Second Series, XX, (1907), p. 362, Duane to Jefferson, 26 September, 1813.

30

Ibid., Duane, "Birds Eye Sketch."

31

American State Papers, Military Affairs, II, p. 46, Duane to Eustis, undated but probably May, 1809.

32

Report of the Committee on Military Affairs, (Washington, 1813), Armstrong to Williams, 8 February, 1813.

33

Annals of Congress, 12th Congress, 2nd Session, 16, 17 February, 1, 2 March, 1813.

34

General Order, Adjutant General's Office, 19 March, 1813, contained in William Duane, *A Hand Book For Infantry: Containing The First Principles of Military Discipline ...* (5th Edition, Philadelphia, 1813). All reference to the *Hand Book* is from this edition.

35

Ibid., pp. 5-6.

36

William Duane, *Explanation of the Plates of the System of Infantry Discipline ...* (Philadelphia, 1814), Forward dated 30 September, 1814; "Hindman" in *Army and Navy Chronicle*, 15 October, 1835, pp. 331-332.

37

Thomas Wilson, *The Biography of the Principal American Military and Naval Heroes ...*, (2 vols., New York, 1817), II, p. 257; *The Drill and Exercise Issued in Orders to the United States Troops of the Sixth Military District*, (Charleston, 1814).

38

U.S. National Archives, RG 107, Series 6, Reel 10, Armstrong to Duane, 5 April, 1814.

39

U.S. National Archives, RG 107, Series 222, Reel 10, Circular Letter, Adjutant General's Office, 24 January, 1814.

40

Ibid., summary of responses to circular letter contained in Armstrong to Duane, 5 April, 1814.

41

"Hindman," *Army and Navy Chronicle*, 15 October, 1835, p. 332.

42

Pennsylvania Historical Society, Daniel Parker Papers, Scott to Walbach, 14 February, 1814.

43

William E. Birkheimer, *Historical Sketch of the ... Artillery: United States Army*, (Washington, 1884), p. 301, Scott to Eustis, 14 July, 1809.

44

Winfield Scott, *Memoirs of Lieut. General Scott, Written by Himself* (2 vols, New York, 1864), 1, pp. 119-120. The translation was I. A. De Lacroix, *Rules and Regulations for the Field Exercise and Manoeuvres of the French Infantry ...* (2 vols., Boston, 1810).

45

Scott, I, p. 120.

46

James Carmichael-Smyth, *Precis of the Wars in Canada* (London, 1862), p. 193. Carmichael-Smyth wrote these words in the 1820's.

47

George Izard, *Official Correspondence ...* (Philadelphia, 1816), p. 3, Izard to Armstrong, May, 1814.

48

Crackel, p. 55.

49

American State Papers, Military Affairs, Vol. 1, Monroe to Speaker, House of Representatives, 22 November, 1814.

50

General Order, 27 December, 1814, contained in the title page of *Rules and Regulations for the Field Exercise and Manoeuvres of Infantry ...* (2 vols., New York, 1815).

51

Ibid. The translation from which the board was directed to work was John Macdonald, *Rules and Regulations for the Field Exercise and Manoeuvres of the French Infantry ... with explanatory Notes, and illustrative Referencees to the British and Prussian Systems of Tactics, etc., etc.*, (2 vols., London, 1803). This was the first credible translation of the 1791 Réglement in English and compared it, paragraph by paragraph, with the British 1792 *Regulations*. On Macdonald and his work, see my bibliographic title, "*Reading maketh a full man:*" *British Military Literature in the Napoleonic Wars. An Annotated Bibliography of the Military Titles Published by the London Firm of Egerton, 1782-1832* (Godmanchester, 2007).

52

U. S. National Archives, RG 107, Series 221, reel 66, Scott to Monroe, 10 January, 1815.

53

General Order, 27 December, 1814, contained in the title page of *Rules and Regulations for the Field Exercise and Manoeuvres of Infantry ...* (2 vols., New York, 1815).

54

Scott, I, p. 207.

55

U. S. National Archives, RG 107, Series 6, reel 12, Orders, War Department, 5 January, 1825.

56

On American infantry manuals in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, see D. E. Graves, " 'Dry Books of Tactics': U.S. Infantry Manuals of the War of 1812 and After", Part II, *Military Historian*, 34 (No. 4, 1986), pp. 173-177 and Henry J. Osterhoudt, "The Evolution of U. S. Army Assault Tactics, 1778-1919: The Search for Sound Doctrine", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Duke University, North Carolina, 1986.

57

During the War of 1812 period, the U. S. artillery used an 1800 American translation of Henri Othon De Scheel's *Treatise of Artillery*, a French work published in Paris in 1795 for the construction of artillery carriages and equipment. The manual for gun drill was an authorized abridgement of Thaddeus Kosciusko's *Manoeuvres of Horse Artillery*, first published in the U. S. in 1808 but originally compiled in Paris in 1800. On American artillery manuals of the War of 1812, see my article on this subject, "For want of this precaution ... many Men lose their Arms:" Official, Semi-Official, and Unofficial American Artillery Texts, 1775-1815," *Military Historian*, Summer 2012, 79-99; Autumn 2012, 190-207. There was no established engineer manual during the war but, in 1817, Captain John O'Connor's translation of Gay de Vernon's *Treatise on the Science of War and Fortifications*, a standard text of the *Ecole Polytechnique*, the French engineer school, was adopted for service.

58

For an overview of French influence on American military thought in the 19th century, see Russell F. Weigley, "American Strategy from its Beginnings through the First World War," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, (Princeton, 1986), pp. 408-44.